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HEARSAY IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS:
THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR CHANGE
Arnold Rochvargt
It is generally accepted that the rules of evidence which govern
the admissibility of evidence in courtroom trials do not apply to
administrative agency adjudications. J Maryland has followed this
general rule since its early days of administrative hearings. 2
there are a few justifications for not requiring administrative
agencies to be bound by the rules of evidence. First, the rules of
evidence were developed for jury trials in order to keep unreliable
evidence from influencing lay jurors. 3 Because administrative hearings

t

Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., George Washington University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Steven P. Grossman for his comments on early drafts of
this article, and John Sayles for his research assistance.
1. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.2 (3d ed. 1991) (describing
this as a "hornbook rule"); see also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126, amended, 312 U.S. 654 (1941); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing,
174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); In re Kennedy,
472 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Del. 1984).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). Maryland, like
many states, has codified this principle. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10208(a) (1984); cj. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-105(4) (1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-13-15 (1990); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 24.275 (West 1981); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-06 (1974 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-10
(1988); TEX. REv. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, sec. 14(a) (West Supp. 1993);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-2 (1986).
3. See Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 689, 693-97 (1962) [hereinafter Davis, Hearsay]; Kenneth C. Davis,
The Residuum Rule in Administrative Law, 28 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1 (1955)
[hereinafter Davis, Residuum Rule]; Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to
Problems oj Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364,
376 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems oj Evidence]; Ernest Gellhorn, Rules
oj Evidence in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 14; Leonard
M. Simon, Note, The Weight to be Given Hearsay Evidence by Administrative
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are not heard by juries,4 but rather by persons with legal expertise,
there is no need to apply the rules of evidence. S Second, it has been
argued that to require an administrative law judge or any presiding
officer to reject inadmissible evidence "makes no sense"6 because
there is no jury to protect and the agency official is "equally exposed
to the evidence whether he admits it or excludes it."7 A third
justification depends not on the absence of a jury in the administrative process, but on the nature of the administrative· process itself
and the reason for its existence. Administrative agencies further policy
goals that the legislature has decided can be best promoted through
a more efficient and speedy process than is available in the traditional
judicial arena. 8 It has been stated that a "major reason for the
creation of workmen's compensation commissions was to avoid the
costly and often impossible burden of the hearsay rule."9 Because
application of the rules of evidence would be contrary to the goals
of the administrative process, they should not apply in administrative
hearings. 10

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Agencies: The Legal Residuum Rule, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265 (1960); Eugene
J. Jeka, Note, Hearsay Evidence Held Admissible but Insubstantial in a Social
Security Hearing, 1 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 162 (1970); Mary J. Morris, Note,
Extent to Which Hearsay Evidence May Constitute Basis for A ward by Workmen's Compensation Commission, 42 MICH. L. REv. 154, 156 (1943); George
P. Faines, Note, Recent Decision: Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981), 20 DUQ. L. REv. 343, 362 (1982);
Note, Hearsay - Admissibility Before Administrative Boards, 37 YALE L.J.
993, 994 (1927).
See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442 (1977).
See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 3; Davis, Problems of Evid.ence,
supra note 3, at 371; Simon, supra note 3, at 265. It has also been suggested
that the rules of evidence were developed for jury trials because juries could
not be trusted to read long documents. Thus, the evidentiary rules which place
emphasis on live oral testimony are aimed at requiring the jury to properly
consider the evidence, a purpose inapplicable to administrative hearings. Davis,
Problems of Evidence, supra note 3, at 397.
See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 14.
Id.; see also Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (9th Cir.
1942). This argument may justify the distinction between following the rules
of evidence in jury trials and not following them in administrative hearings. It
does not, however, explain why judges who hear cases without juries are bound
to follow the rules of evidence. See Pamela S. Sellnow, Note, Administrative
Adjudication: Effect of the New Texas Rules of Evidence, 35 BAYLOR L. REv.
361 (1983).
See Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. 1981).
Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 6.
There is, however, opposition to the majority view. See Spaulding v. Howlett,
375 N.E.2d 47 (III. App. Ct. 1978) (stating hearsay generally not admissible in
Illinois administrative proceedings); Douglas M. Wyckoff, Evidentiary Standards in Formal Administrative Proceedings, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1990, at 67
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Because the rules of evidence applicable in trials do· not apply
in administrative adjudications, the admission of evidence at an
administrative hearing that would not be admissible at a trial does
not constitute grounds for reversal. lI One of the more significant
consequences of this is that hearsay is not excluded at administrative
hearings. 12 Just because the agency decision is immune from attack
on the issue of admissibility, however, does not mean that the agency
decision cannot be attacked on the basis of the evidentiary record.
All agency adjudicatory decisions must be supported by substantial evidence l3 and must comport with due process. 14 The substantial evidence requirement and due process considerations pose
special problems when an agency decision is based solely on hearsay.
"Substantial evidence" requires that the agency record contain sufficient relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the agency conclusion. ls In order to satisfy this
reasonableness test, the evidence must be not only probative, but
also reliable. 16 There are inherent impediments, however, towards

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.
16.

(suggesting that the Florida Evidence Code should apply to administrative
hearings); see also Thomas R. Mubroy, Jr. & Douglas G. McClure, The Case
for Allowing Hearsay in Illinois Administrative Proceedings, ILL. B.J., June
1989, at 552.
This does not mean, however, that agencies must admit all evidence offered.
Pursuant to Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act, the agency may exclude
evidence that is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious. MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-208(c) (1984); see also Administrative Procedure
Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) ("[T)he agency as a matter of policy shall
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious
evidence."); Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 4-212(a), 15 U.L.A.
86 (1981) ("[U)pon proper objection, the presiding officer shall exclude evidence
that is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious or excusable on constitutional
or statutory grounds or on the basis of evidentiary privilege recognized in the
courts of this state. ").
See Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 4-212(a), 15 V.L.A. 86 (1981);
Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, Rules of Procedure, COMAR
28.02.01.18(C) (1992) [hereinafter OAH Rules of Procedure); see also OAH
Rules of Procedure, COMAR 28.02.01.15(B) (1992) (authorizing an administrative law judge to admit an affidavit as evidence).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-215(g)(3)(v) (1984); see also Administrative
Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988); Model State Administrative
Procedure Act § 5-116(c)(7), 15 U.L.A. 127 (1981).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 1O-215(g)(3)(i) (1984); see also Administrative
Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1988); Model State Administrative
Procedure Act § 5-116(c)(1), -15 U.L.A. 127 (1981).
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); American
Radio-Tel. Servo v. Public Servo Comm'n, 33 Md. App. 423, 433, 365 A.2d
314, 319 (1976).
See Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md.
573, 598, 565 A.2d 1015, 1027 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); see
also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoe. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992)
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evaluating evidence that consists solely of hearsay, for there is no
opportunity to test the evidence through cross-examination.1 7 Moreover, cross-examination is part of the due process required in administrative hearings. IS
Because of the tension between the substantial evidence requirement and the right of cross-examination on the one hand, and an
agency's obligation to admit hearsay evidence on the other, courts
subject administrative agency decisions based solely on hearsay to
"exacting scrutiny."19 Therefore, although an administrative agency's
decision will not be reversed because of the admission of hearsay,
administrative decisions based solely on hearsay may be reversed due
to lack of adequate evidentiary support. 20
The purpose of this Article is to review and analyze the role of
hearsay in Maryland state agency adjudications. The Article first
discusses early Maryland cases addressing the admissibility of hearsay
evidence at de novo appeals of agency decisions. 21 The discussion
then proceeds to later Maryland cases, where the early admissibility
standards were applied to assess the sufficiency of hearsay directly
at the agency adjudication level.
The analysis will show that although the Maryland courts have
usually recognized the problems raised by reliance on hearsay, they
have nonetheless failed to develop a uniform analytical approach
towards the treatment of hearsay. The courts' haphazard approach
has given rise to largely superficial opinions, and has created incon(providing parameters for admissibility of out of court statements of child
abuse victims).
17. ladallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment, 476 A.2d 671, 678
(D.C. 1984). The Jadallah court noted that when hearsay is presented, the
agency "will not be able fully to explore and evaluate shortcomings in the
original declarant's perception, memory and veracity as well as any defect in
the transmission of information between the original declarant and the testifying
witness." [d.
18. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-208(e)(3) (1984); Colorado Dep't of
Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16,21 (Colo. 1987); Dragen v. Connecticut Medical
Exam. Bd., 591 A.2d 150, 153 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Cassella v. Civil Servo
Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Tron V. Prince George's
County, 69 Md. App. 256, 262, 517 A.2d 113, 116 (1986); Unemployment
Compensation Bd. V. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1981).
19. Lim V. Taxicab Comm'n, 564 A.2d 720, 724 (D.C. 1989); see also Nat Stern,

The Substantial Evidence Rule in Administrative Proceedings: Restrictions on
the Use of Hearsay Since Richardson V. Perales, 36 ARK. L. REv. 102, 11011, 116 (1982).

"

20. See Martin V. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement Bd., 532
A.2d 102, 109 (D.C. 1987); Longe V. Department of Employment Sec., 380
A.2d 76, 78 (Vt. 1977); Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 694-95.
21. For a discussion of the appeals process in early administrative adjudications,
see Reuben Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 MD. L. REv.
185, 206-10 (1938).
.
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sistent case law. Moreover, the failure to articulate a consistent
analysis has denied litigants, presiding officers, and administrative
agencies proper guidance on the role of hearsay in administrative
adjudications.
After analyzing Maryland precedent, the Article develops an
analytical framework around which administrative decisions based
on hearsay can be evaluated. The foundation of this framework is
the recognition that, because the nature and function of state agencies
differ from one to another, the role of hearsay may similarly differ
among the agencies. To properly account for the variance among
agencies, the Article concludes that administrative guidelines for
hearsay should be developed for each agency's adjudicative process.
THE EARLY YEARS (1916-1938)
Administrative adjudications first became a significant feature
of the legal landscape with the enactment of workers' compensation
statutes during the first few decades of the twentieth century. 22 These
statutes created special administrative tribunals to provide compensation to workers who were accidentally injured on the job. In order
to further this policy, the common law defenses of assumption of
risk, contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule were abolished. 23 Moreover, the workers' compensation statutes provided that
the common law and statutory rules of evidence would not apply at
the agency hearings. 24 This statutory abolition of the rules of evidence
gave birth to a debate on the proper role of hearsay in administrative
adjudications.
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice CO.,25 a 1916 New York case, is
generally considered to be the first major case dealing with hearsay
and administrative hearings. 26 Carroll was an appeal by the Knickerbocker Ice Company following a commission's award of workers'
compensation to the plaintiff. The case involved Myles Carroll, an
ice deliveryman who died, allegedly, from the effects of a 300 pound
block of ice falling upon him. The only evidence offered at the
commission hearing proving that the accident had occurred, however,
22. Maryland's workers' compensation law was enacted in 1914. See General
Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 72, 555 A.2d 542, 544 (1989).
23. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1.10, 1.20,
4.30-4.50, 5.20 (1991).
24. See Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 252-53, 127 A. 850, 851 (1925);
see also Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 61; 2B LARSON, supra note 23, § 79.30.
25. 113 N.B. 507 (N.Y; 1916).
26. In fact, there had been an earlier case from Michigan, Reck v. Whittles berger ,
148 N.W. 247 (Mich. 1914). Carroll, however, is generally regarded as the
leading case in this area. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, §§ 7.2, 7.4; Morris,
supra note 3, at 155; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 1.
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was hearsay. Specifically, Carroll's widow, a neighbor, a treating
phySician, and physicians at the hospital each testified that Carroll
had told them about the accident. Conversely, Carroll's helper on
the ice wagon and two employees of the saloon where the accident
allegedly occurred testified that they were present when and where
the decedent was allegedly injured, but had seen no such accident.
Moreover, physicians who had examined Carroll testified that they
had found no bruises, discolorations or abrasions on Carroll's body.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the commission's
finding that Carroll had died from a work related injury and that
his widow was entitled to benefits under the statute. The court
recognized that the legislature had abolished the rules of evidence
for workers' compensation cases, and that the agency decision could
not be "overturned on account of any alleged error in receiving
evidence."27 Emphasizing, however, that an award had to be supported by some competent (i.e. nonhearsay) evidence, the court
devised what has become known as the legal residuum rule. The legal
residuum rule mandates that there must be "a residuum of legal
evidence to support the claim before an award can be made.' '28
Because substantial evidence supported the view that no accident had
occurred, the award was reversed. 29
The Carroll legal residuum rule became the standard for other
state courts when deciding the proper role of hearsay in agency
hearings. 30 By 1925, the legal residuum rule had been adopted in at
least six states 31 and had been rejected by none. As opposed to
Carroll, Maryland's early cases pertaining to the role of hearsay in
administrative hearings did not concern themselves with hearsay

27. Carroll, 113 N.E. at 508.
28. Id. at 509.
29. Id. The majority opinion represented the views of four of the seven judges of
the Court of Appeals of New York. One concurring judge thought that it was
possible for hearsay to support a finding without some nonhearsay in the
record, but that in this case the award could not stand because the hearsay
was directly contradicted. Id. (Bartlett, C.J., concurring). In his dissent, Judge
Seabury stated that in light of the "social benefit which the law was designed
to promote," the decision could be based solely on hearsay as long as it was
"trustworthy." Id. at 509-11 (Seabury, J., dissenting).
30. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 7.4; see also Brewerton Coal Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 154 N.E. 412 (III. 1926); Swim v. Central Fuel Co., 215 N.W. 603
(Iowa 1927); Strout's Case, 140 A. 377 (Me. 1928).
'
31. By 1925, the legal residuum rule had been adopted in Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Utah. See Royal v. Hawkeye Portland Cement
Co., 192 N.W. 406 (Iowa 1923); Valentine v. Weaver, 228 S.W. 1036 (Ky.
1921); Kelly's Case, 122 A. 580 (Me. 1923); Beck v. Whittlesberger, 148 N.W.
247 (Mich. 1914); Riley v. Carnegie Steel Co., 119 A. 832 (Pa. 1923); Garfield
Smelting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 P. 57 (Utah 1918).
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testimony presented at the agency level. Rather, these cases focused
upon the admissibility of such hearsay when a party sought to
introduce it at the de novo trial court review of the agency decisionY
The first Maryland case to discuss the proper role of hearsay in
the agency hearing process was Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey.J3 Mealey
was a workers' compensation case with facts similar to those in
Carroll. Mr. Mealey delivered oil before dying of leukemia. It was
alleged that the leukemia was aggravated by an accidental injury
suffered during an oil delivery. Although there were no signs of any
bruises on Mr. Mealey, Mr. Mealey's widow, his building superintendent, and three doctors who had treated him just before his death
testified that Mealey had told each of them that he had slipped and
hit his left side on his delivery wagon. 34 Mealey prevailed at the
agency level, and on de novo appeal the trial court admitted the
hearsay evidence pertaining to Mr. Mealey's alleged workplace injury.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first stated that because the
rules of evidence were developed for jury trials, it could not be
expected that administrative hearing commissions could adhere to
them.3s Furthermore, the court noted that the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act expressly provided that the commission was not
bound by the rules of evidence. 36 The Mealey court then discussed
Carroll, wherein a similar provision in New York's workers' compensation statute was interpreted as permitting hearsay to be con sidered by the commission; but barring an award from being based on
hearsay alone. The Maryland court also recognized that the Carroll
approach had been followed in six other states.J7
Nevertheless, the Mealey court elected not to follow the Carroll
approach, holding instead that because of the "increased latitude
allowed to the Commission," the courts must "adapt" the procedures
involving the admissibility of evidence as long as there is an "assurance of reliability."38 The court then held that even though hearsay
was the only evidence of the accidental nature of the injury, the
32. Review of workers' compensation cases is still de novo. See General Motors
Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 555 A.2d 542 (1989).
33. 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
34. [d. at 251-52, 127 A. at 851.
35. [d. at 252, 127 A. at 851". At the time, section 10 of the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act, 3 Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art. 101, provided that "[t]he
commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules
of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure . . . but may
make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit
of this act." [d. at 252-53,127 A. at 851.
36. [d. at 252-53, 127 A. at 851.
37. [d. at 253, 127 A. at 851.
38. [d. at 254, 127 A. at 851.
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commission's finding that the fall had occurred was sufficiently
supported. The court's holding was based on two factors: the number
of witnesses who had testified as to the same event and that the
hearsay concerned a simple fact with "no room for substantial
misunderstanding. "39
The Mealey decision led Maryland on a path different from
other states in the early years of administrative law. Not until more
than fifty years later did a significant number of other states join
Maryland in rejecting CarroWs legal residuum rule. By forging a new
path at this early date, however, Maryland courts could not look to
other state opinions for assistance in dealing with the proper role of
hearsay absent a legal residuum requirement. Because Maryland has
such a long history on this issue, a close analysis of its hearsay and
administrative adjudication cases is useful to illuminate not only the
present state of the law in Maryland, but also to aid in understanding
cases from other states which have more recently rejected the legal
residuum rule.
There are a few criticisms of Mealey. The first is that although
the court adopted a reliability test as the appropriate test, it did not
distinguish between the reliability of the testimony of the different
witnesses. For example, the testimony of the doctors should have
been viewed as more reliable than the testimony from the widow or
superintendent because statements to treating physicians by patients
are more likely to be truthful due to the patient's interest in receiving
proper medical care.40 Moreover, unlike the widow, the doctors were
disinterested persons in this compensation hearing. The testimony of
disinterested witnesses about hearsay statements should be viewed as
more reliable than testimony from interested persons. 41
A second criticism of Mealey is that the court was persuaded
that the hearsay was reliable because it concerned a simple fact with
no room for misunderstanding. 42 This, however, confuses the issue,
for the focus ought not to be on whether Mr. Mealey's widow
correctly reported what her husband told her, but rather whether
Mr. Mealey's statement was true. The simplicity of the factual
component of the statement may support the position that Mrs.

39. [d. at 255, 127 A. at 852.

40. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1
(1989 & Supp. 1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); Maryland
Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589-90,
565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277 (John W.
Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
41. This is primarily a matter of credibility, see, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK, supra note
40, § 39, but is also related to the hearsay reliability issues of the witness's
perception and memory of the out-of-hearing statements, id. § 245.
42. Standard Oil CO. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 255, 127 A. 850, 852 (1925).
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Mealey did not inaccurately report her conversation with her husband,
but this was not especially crucial in light of the fact that she testified
in person and was subject to cross-examination. The real problem
with hearsay evidence arises when it is offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. Because the hearsay in Mealey was introduced
to prove the assertion that there had been a fall, the simplicity of
the statement does not prove its reliability.
Two years after the decision in Mealey, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland heard Standard Gas Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin. 43
Baldwin involved a death certificate signed by a coroner that listed
the cause of death as heart disease, aggravated by burns caused by
an accidental fall on hot metal. 44 The death certificate was the only
evidence linking Mr. Baldwin's death to an injury suffered while
working as an iron molder. The health department had been told
this information by the deceased's widow. 45
In deciding Baldwin, the Court of Appeals of Maryland first
noted that, although the report would not be admissible under the
rules of evidence, Mealey had relaxed the use of hearsay in the
review of workers' compensation cases. Nonetheless, the reviewing
court still had a duty to review the administrative decision for
sufficiency of evidence. The court of appeals found that the evidence
had "no probative value" because it "lacked the indicia of reliabilitY,"46 and therefore, "should have been excluded. "47
There are various criticisms that can be made of Baldwin. The
major criticism is that its conclusion was reached without any analysis. Although the court of appeals said that it was employing a
reliability test, there was no discussion of the reliability issue. For
example, the court did not recognize that the evidence was in fact
double hearsay which requires an evaluation of the reliability of each
layer of hearsay. 48 Moreover, the court seemed to be confusing
probative value and reliability. Evidence is probative if it is relevant
to the issue and is useful to either prove or disprove a fact;49 evidence

43. 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927).
44. The death certificate provided that "[tlhe cause of death was as follows:
Valvular heart disease. Contributory - burns on body accidental resulting
from fall (secondary) on hot metal." [d. at 326, 136 A. at 646.
45. [d.
46. [d.
47. [d.
48. See FED. R. EVID. 805; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 324.1; Porter v.
District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 518 A.2d 1020, 1025 n.3
(D.C. 1986); Longe v. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76, 79 (Vt.
1977).
49. Relevant evidence has been defined in the following way. One fact is relevant
to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the
existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders

10
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which is not probative may be excluded at an agency adjudication. 50
Conversely, reliability pertains not to relevancy, but rather to credibility, and whether the evidence is worthy of belief. 51 Whereas it is
possible that evidence may be probative but not reliable, or reliable
but not probative, the Baldwin court improperly treated reliability
and probative value as synonymous.
Despite these criticisms, the conclusion reached in Baldwin seems
correct. Unlike in Mealy, the widow did not testify about how she
learned of the accident. It is clear she was not at the worksite;
therefore, she had to have been told of the accident by some third
person. Although fellow workers were present, none actually witnessed the accident. 52 Furthermore, Baldwin's widow did not testify
and was not subject to cross-examination about the basis of the
report. Moreover, unlike in Mealy, the deceased never was able to
tell anyone about the accident. Mr. Baldwin was apparently unconscious from the time of his heart attack until his death, so there
were no statements made to any treating physicians. 53. Therefore,
although the court's analysis in Baldwin is not helpful, a close
examination of the facts provides support for its conclusion.
Similar to Mealy, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylo,.s4 involved
using a deceased worker's statements to prove that death resulted
from an accidental work related injury. Hearsay testimony from both
Traylor's widow and his landlady alleged that he had been exposed
to carbon monoxide while repairing a gasoline engine at his employer's plant. Additionally, there was eyewitness testimony as to the

50.

51.
52.

53.
54.

the existence of the other either certain or more probable. Miko v. Committee
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 596 A.2d 396, 406 (Conn. 1991) (citing
State v. McClendon, 505 A.2d 685,687 (Conn. 1986». Evidence is "probative"
when it has the tendency "to establish the proposition that it is offered to
prove .... Evidence that is probative often is said to have 'logical relevance.'''
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 185.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 1O-208(b) to 1O-208(c) (1984).
Reliable evidence has been defined as the kind of evidence which responsible
persons are accustomed to rely upon in serious affairs. It is evidence that is
intrinsically trustworthy. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 353.
Baldwin's fellow employee, Herman Roffles, was present at the time of the
alleged accident. He testified:
I was sitting down watching some metal in the process of melting in
a furnace . . . . Mr. Baldwin came past . . . . I took my eye off of
him to look at the furnace, and as I did some one [sic] hollered, and
I immediately looked around, and I saw Mr. Baldwin in a sitting
position.
Standard Gas Equip. Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 328, 136 A. 644, 647
(1927).
Baldwin, 152 Md. at 323-24, 136 A. at 645. Baldwin was carried to the hospital,
but was pronounced dead on arrival. Id.
158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1929).
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carbon monoxide exposure. The court ruled that the hearsay was
"merely cumulative, "55 and therefore upheld the commission's award.
It is not clear whether Traylor employed the earlier reliability
test or a new harmless error approach. Because other witnesses
testified as to their personal observation of the gas exposure, the
hearsay was merely cumulative; the hearsay, therefore, need not have
been relied upon to prove the accident. Although it might be seen
as "harmless" to consider hearsay that merely repeats eyewitness
testimony,56 one might question how "harmless" it was when used
to evaluate the credibility of other witnessesY To the extent that
Traylor does develop a harmless error approach, this limitation
should be recognized.
Conversely, Traylor is perhaps better seen as merely an application of Mealey's reliability test. It has been argued that hearsay is
reliable if supported by nonhearsay. 58 The hearsay in Traylor thus
manifested indicia of reliability because it was consistent with eyewitness accounts. Another argument in support of Traylor is that,
unlike in Baldwin, there was a disinterested witness - the landlady.
Testimony of disinterested witnesses is generally viewed as more
reliable than testimony from witnesses who have an interest in the
matter. Moreover, both the landlady and the widow were available
for cross-examination .
. In Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm,59 hearsay
testimony was offered by a deceased worker's widow. Apparently,
the widow had been told before her husband's death that he had
been injured while mining coal. As in Traylor, there were also
eyewitnesses to the accidental injury. Nonetheless, the widow's claim
was disallowed by the commission. The reviewing court, however,
passing judgment on the same hearsay evidence heard by the commission, reversed. Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals
stated that while some hearsay might have to be excluded as unworthy
of reliance, "nothing in the hearsay evidence in the present record
... would have required its exclusion" for it added "little more"

55. [d. at 124, 130, 148 A. at 249, 252.
56. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
57. See Langlois v. Department of Employment Training, 546 A.2d 1365, 1370
(Vt. 1988). This concern applies not only to hearsay, but also whenever harmless
error is argued. See generally Charles F. Campbell, An Economic View oj
Developments in the Harmless Error and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L.
REv. 499 (1990).
58. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Hentges v.
Bartach, 533 P.2d 66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Unemployment Compensation
Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981); Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note
3, at 6.
59. 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932).
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than the testimony of eyewitnesses. 60 The court pointed out that
although there was no need to have received hearsay that merely
duplicated the direct evidence, this turned out to be "unimportant. "61
More persuasive to the court was that, as in Mealey, the hearsay
referred to a "single fact and a simple occurrence. "62 The court also
rejected the argument that hearsay in general is inherently more
subject to falsity than direct evidence. 63
On one level, Chisholm might be viewed as merely an application
of Mealey, for the hearsay was consistent with direct evidence and
the subject matter of the hearsay was relatively simple. Therefore,
the same criticisms directed towards Mealey also apply to Chisholm. 64
Chisholm's import, however, extends significantly beyond Mealey,
for it is the first case discussing the need for hearsay based on the
availability of nonhearsay. 6S Although this has been discussed by
later courts and commentators as especially relevant,66 the Chisholm
court did not believe it to be significant in reaching its decision. 67
Chisholm is also significant in its rejection of the notion that
all hearsay is inherently more unreliable than direct evidence. This
position later became a focus of those who argued against the legal
residuum rule in other states. 68

60. [d. at 53, 161 A. at 278. The court noted that although it was a novelty to
discriminate between hearsay, this process was not entirely new. [d.
61. [d. at 54, 161 A. at 278.

62. [d.
63. [d. The court stated that "there is of course, danger of falsity in thus
reproducing statements, but hardly any greater danger than there is of falsity
in the testimony of eyewitnesses." [d.
64. See discussion supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
65. See Chisholm, 163 Md. at 54, 161 A. at 278.
66. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1939); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909,
913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); ludallah V. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 678 (D.C. 1984); Wallace V. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972); Embers of
Salisbury, Inc. V. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 835
(Mass. 1988) (Lynch, 1., dissenting); Unemployment Compensation Bd. V.
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981); Ronald K. L. Collins, Hearsay and the

Administrative Process: A Review. and Reconsideration oj the State oj the Law
oj Certain Evidentiary Procedures Applicable in California Administrative
Proceedings, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 577,645-46 (1976); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at
19-22.
67. Chisholm, 163 Md. at 54, 161 A. at 278. The court stated "[t)he remaining
part of the hearsay . . . seems to us not to be so unsafe and unreliable as a
basis for the adjudication that the jury should not have been permitted to
consider it." [d.
68. See Cassella, 494 A.2d at 914; Ceja, 427 A.2d at 637-38; Collins, supra note
66, at 613; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5; leka, supra note 3, at
162.
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In Horn Ice Cream v. Yost,69 the mother of a deceased worker
testified as to the accidental nature of the injury which caused her
son's death. Relying on Traylor and Chisholm, the court in Yost
found no reversible error because the hearsay added little more than
had been given by eyewitnesses. The court did not identify whether
it was viewing the cumulative nature of the hearsay as relating to its
reliability or the harmlessness of its use, although its statement that
"it is not apparent how the ruling could have injured appellants"70
adds more support to a harmless error theory. The same criticism of
a harmless error approach made in regard to the Traylor opinion
would also apply here. 71
Another case, Dembeck v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 72 involved a medical report prepared by a Dr. Bay, the medical examiner
and advisor to the State Industrial Accident Commission, who had
examined Mr. Dembeck. The report was submitted after the hearing,
but prior to the final decision of the commission. The commission
suspended Dembeck's benefits, a holding affirmed by the trial-level
reviewing court. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision to suspend benefits because "no opportunity was afforded
the claimant to interrogate Dr. Bay as to the report or cross-examine
him. "73 This, the court wrote, denied Dembeck his right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against [him], and an opportunity to
test the correctness or truthfulness of the evidence by cross-examination. "74 The court also stated that justice requires that "the parties
be informed of the source of the information against them and be
given the opportunity to prove the information is not true. "75 Even
though Dr. Bay's report seemed to be nothing more than cumulative
testimony to that offered by Dembeck, reversal was still warranted
because the court had "no way of determining the effect or the
additional weight given by the commission" to the report since "it
was made by an employee of the commission who was supposed to
be, and doubtless was, entirely disinterested and impartial. "76
Although Dembeck may be best explained on the basis of a
violation of the exclusiveness of the record doctrine," it has been

69. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933).
70. [d. at 30, 163 A. at 825.
71. See discussion supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
72. 166 Md. 21, 170 A. 158 (1934).
73. [d. at 27, 170 A. at 160.
74. [d.
75. [d. at 28, 170 A. at 160.
76. [d.
77. The doctrine of exclusiveness of the record has been explained as follows:
Where a hearing is prescribed by statute, nothing must be taken into
account by the administrative tribunal in arriving at its determination
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cited subsequently as a hearsay case,78 and therefore raises various
issues involving hearsay. Even though the hearsay was cumulative,
unlike earlier cases, Dembeck rejected a harmless error approach. In
Dembeck there was· recognition that hearsay could tip the balance if
there is conflicting direct evidence. Dembeck also has very broad
language concerning a claimant's right of cross-examination and
confrontation, which, if taken literally, would severely limit the use
of hearsay at agency hearings. This concern of the Dembeck court
had not been evident from earlier opinions. Moreover, the court's
discussion of whether the witnesses were disinterested was a new
approach. In Dembeck, because the hearsay was from a disinterested
witness, the court was unwilling to view the hearsay as harmless. In
earlier cases, the fact that the hearsay came from a disinterested
witness indicated its reliability. 79 It should be noted, however, that
reliability was not the major concern of the court in Dembeck. In
general, Dembeck is much narrower than earlier Maryland cases,
and, as will be seen, is much 'narrower than later cases. Its validity,
however, has never been questioned by subsequent Maryland opinions.
Spence v. Bethlehem Steel CO.80 again involved a worker who
died after alleged accidental exposure to poisonous gas. The evidence
in the record relating to the alleged accident were statements made
by the deceased worker to his wife and testimony by an examining
physician that the worker had said that he had been poisoned. The
employer offered no evidence to refute that an accident occurred.
The court first noted that the "weight of authority ... seems to be
that the statements of the patient as to, the cause of his condition or
injury would not be admissible, "81 but that there was also authority
for admitting such evidence when it related to the doctor's ability to
diagnose and treat the case. 82 The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
citing its earlier cases, stated that it "has allowed more latitude in
the admission of statements in compensation cases of one injured,

78.
79.

80.
81.
82.

that has not been introduced in some manner into the record of the
hearing .... Unless the principle is observed, the right to a hearing
becomes meaningless. Of what real worth is the right to present
evidence and to argue its significance at a formal hearing, if the one
who decides the case may stray at will from the record in reaching
his decision?
Mazza v. Cavicchia, 105 A.2d 545,554 (N.J. 1954); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T § 10-209 (1984).
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 129, 314 A.2d 113, 115
(1974).
See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930).
173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).
[d. at 547, 197 A. at 305.
[d. at 547, 197 A. at 306.
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where death ensued, as to the cause of the injury.' '83 The court
added that such hearsay "should be received with great caution"
only from workers who are unavailable because of their death, and
only if the statement had been made "so promptly after the alleged
injury and so closely related to the facts and physical conditions as
to give them substantial probative value.' '84. The court concludeo that
it was appropriate in this case for the agency to rely upon both the
testimony of the wife and doctor.
Although not as narrow as Dembeck, Spence does take a narrower approach to hearsay than that taken by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in its earliest cases. First, Spence reflects a' distrust of
hearsay. Earlier, in Chisholm, the court expressly rejected the notion
that hearsay is inherently more unreliable than nonhearsay. 85 Moreover, Spence permits reliance on hearsay only when the declarant is
unavailable because of death. This also was not the rule of earlier
cases. Spence also viewed reliability in light of the fact that the
statement was made near the time of the injury. Despite these new
considerations, Spence does mark a return to reliability as the court's
major concern.

Summary
Between 1925 and 1938, Maryland rejected the legal residuum
approach and adopted the rule that hearsay by itself could support
an administrative decision as long as the reviewing court was assured
of the hearsay's reliability. The earliest cases indicate that hearsay
was more likely to be found reliable if the hearsay involved a simple
fact not subject to misunderstanding, and if the hearsay was corroborated by more than one witness, preferably one of whom was
disinterested. The Maryland courts had also relied on harmless error
to resolve the hearsay issue, but had written inconsistent opinions
relating to harmless error. The judiciary had also considered the
availability of the declarant, but it was not clear how important this
was. The last two opinions during this period evidenced some hesitation and concern about allowing agencies to rely on hearsay.
THE MIDDLE YEARS (1950-1971)
During the period after World War II until the United States
Supreme Court decision in Richardson v. Perales86 in 1971, the legal
83. Id. at 548, 197 A. at 306.
84. Id. at 549-50, 197 A. at 307.
85. Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 53, 161 A. 267,
278 (1932); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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residuum rule was, despite scholarly criticism, the majority approachY Such criticism noted that the legal residuum rule failed to
distinguish between reliable and unreliable hearsay. 88 Moreover, it
was argued that the rule did not fully protect litigants because it
allowed a small amount of nonhearsay to bootstrap a large amount
of hearsay, 89 and likewise, that in applying the legal residuum rule,
the courts seemed to always find some residuum of competent
evidence. 90 The central debate in the majority of states during this
period - whether to abandon the legal residuum rule - was not
relevant in Maryland because Maryland never adopted it. Despite
having resolved the general issue that hearsay by itself could support
an agency finding, however, Maryland courts still struggled in an
attempt to find the appropriate balance between the administrative
process's desire for efficiency and reliance on hearsay, and the parties'
interest in a fair hearing.
Nearly thirty years elapsed between the Court of Appeals of
Maryland's Spence opinion and its next significant opinion on hearsay
and administrative hearings, Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny.91
Factually and procedurally similar to many of its predecessors, Quasny
involved the testimony of a widow concerning statements made to
her by her husband prior to his death relating to an alleged work
related injury. The widow's claim was allowed by the commission
and affirmed by the trial-level reviewing court. The employer argued
that Maryland's earlier line of cases established the rule that in order
for the agency to rely on the hearsay, "there must be some other
corroborative testimony, and the statement must refer to a simple
fact and leave no room for substantial misunderstanding. "92 The
Quasny court rejected this test and said that the court of appeals in
its earlier cases had "been careful to formulate no binding rule. "93
Quasny then concluded that, in this case, the widow's testimony had
"substantial probative value."94 Although the husband's statement
to his wife was made six to eight hours after the accident, the

87. See 1 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 4(b), at 40-41 (3d ed. 1940); Collins, supra
note 66, at 607; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 689.
88. See Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 689; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note
3, at 4.

89. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Cardillo, 106 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir.
1939); Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 696; see also Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981).

90. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 30; Simon, supra note 3, at 276.
But see Ptaszynski v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 114 N.E.2d 38 (N.Y. 1953).
9l. 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967).
92. [d. at 580, 227 A.2d at 24.

93. [d.
94. [d.
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husband had not been physically able to make a statement until that
time. The court also found it significant that the husband had been
given last rites by a priest before speaking with his wife, and that
the widow's testimony had not been contradicted. Moreover, the
court found the explanation of the accident "coherent and plausible. "95 The court was not troubled by the lack of any evidence that
corroborated the hearsay.
The Quasny analysis, with its major focus on the reliability of
the hearsay, is typical of the approach the Maryland courts took
during the sixties and early seventies. In most of the cases during
this period, however, the courts seemed to be very willing to find
reliability. For example, the Quasny court emphasized the lack of
contradictory evidence and downplayed the lack of corroboration,
when in fact both stemmed from one common factor - that no one
saw the accident. There also seemed to be no reason to find the
widow's hearsay testimony reliable merely because it was "plausible"
where other explanations, for example, that there had been no
"accidental" injury, were equally plausible. Moreover, the court was
influenced in its reliability finding by the administration of last rites
even though there was no argument and thus no finding that the
statement was a "dying declaration."96 Quasny is an excellent example
of Maryland's liberal treatment of hearsay during the middle period.
The next decision, Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore,97 was a
zoning case involving whether a doctor's office could be located in
a residential apartment building. The owner of the apartment house
testified at the hearing that 95% of the doctor's patients lived in the
immediate area. The owner claimed that he had been told this by
the doctor, who was not present at the hearing. In permitting the
zoning variance for the doctor's office, the zoning board expressly
relied upon this 95070 figure. In reviewing the zoning board's decision,
the court first cited Mealey and Quasny for the principle that hearsay
that is "credible and has sufficient probative force" may serve as
the basis of an administrative decision. 98 In this case, the apartment
owner's testimony "bore the indicia of reliability"99 because he had
heard the doctor's claims several times, the doctor's statement was
"simple and direct and not likely to have been misunderstood by the

95. [d. at 581, 227 A.2d at 24.
96. Dying declarations have long been held to be admissible in court as an exception
to the hearsay rule because of their presumed reliability. See Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (citing Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895) and
Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881».
97. 251 Md. 92, 246 A.2d 583 (1968).
98. [d. at 97, 246 A.2d at 586.
99. [d. at 98, 246 A.2d at 587.
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hearer," 100 and it was not contradicted by the opposing party. 101
The court's analysis in Neuman is conclusory and again reflects
a very liberal approach towards the use of hearsay at administrative
hearings. A less cursory approach, however, might have led to a
diff~rent conclusion. A self-serving statement by a tenant to a landlord cannot be equated in terms of reliability to statements of injury
made by a worker to a treating physician or even a spouse. There is
nothing inherently reliable about statements made by tenants to
landlords. Moreover, the fact that it was repeated several times did
not prove the underlying reliability of the statement, for while the
doctor may have honestly believed that 95% of his patients were
from the area, cross-examination might have revealed that this figure
was based on speculation or improper data.
Properly framed, the issue in Neuman should not have been
whether the apartment owner correctly testified as to what was
reported to him (simple, direct and not misunderstood), but rather,
whether the information related to him had a substantial basis in
reality. This evidence was uniquely within the doctor's possession,
yet he did not testify. The zoning variance opponents did not have
access to the patient's addresses, and therefore should not have been
faulted for not offering contradictory evidence. Nevertheless, the
court had no problem upholding the agency's reliance on this testimony. Neuman is perhaps the most liberal case allowing the use of
hearsay.
Eger v. Stone,t°2 another zoning case, involved a special exception
request for a parking lot. A resident opposing the petition testified
that she had investigated traffic accidents in the area; she further
submitted a list of these accidents. The zoning board denied the
special request, but the circuit court reversed, disregarding the resident's testimony because it was hearsay.103 The court of appeals,
however, reversed the lower court and upheld the agency.I04 The Eger
court wrote that the circuit court had issued its ruling before Neuman
was decided, but that the court of appeals had recently decided that
hearsay, "if credible and of sufficient probative force, may indeed
be the sole basis" of an administrative decision. lOS Again, the Eger
court took only a quick look at the hearsay, concluding that the
resident's testimony was of "sufficient credibility and probative

100. Id.
101. Id.

102. 253 Md. 533, 253 A.2d 372 (1969).
103. Id. at 541, 253 A.2d at 376.
104. /d. at 542, 253 A.2d at 377.
105. Id.

1991]

Hearsay in Adininistrative Hearings

19

force"l06 because it supported expert testimony that the area posed
a potential traffic hazard.
Several points are worth noting here. First, the circuit court
opinion could not be explained solely because it was drafted prior
to Neuman because Neuman was not the first case to hold hearsay
sufficient to support an agency finding. Rather, this became established as the Maryland rule in Mealey in 1925. 107 Second, the Eger
court seemed satisfied with the reliability of the hearsay merely
because it complemented direct evidence. Other arguments for upholding the agency, however, seem more persuasive. For example,
the accident reports were available from the police and were accessible
to both parties. The resident who testified had merely gathered the
data and testified to the fact that accidents had occurred. Accident
reports are clearly reliable on that issue, if not on attribution of
fault. Third, unlike in Neuman, the hearsay testimony was not subject
to an attack on its reliability. Eger would have been more analogous
to Neuman had the witness testified about a poll someone else had
taken of which she knew only the results. Eger therefore was a much
easier case than Neuman in which to uphold the use of hearsay.
Redding v. Board of County Commissioners lO8 was the last
Maryland decision dealing with hearsay and administrative hearings
prior to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Richardson
v. Perales. The Redding opinion is bare. Redding involved a dismissal
hearing of a police officer where tape recordings were introduced
into evidence. The court upheld the use of the hearsay noting that
there had been no objection to the hearsay when it was introduced
at the hearing. There is not much in Redding to analyze; the most
significant feature of the opinion was the court's willingness to accept
hearsay without regard for those issues that make hearsay evidence
suspect. Redding gives the impression that by 1971 the Maryland
court had reached the position that these hearsay cases did not merit
much attention.

Summary
The case law in Maryland during the period 1967-1971 evidences
a very liberal approach towards the use of hearsay by administrative
agencies. The court in each case was very willing to rely on hearsay
as the basis of an administrative decision without much analysis of
the issue. Although the courts still cited the need to find reliability,
they were lax in their scrutiny of the reliability issue. Moreover, the
judiciary during this period eschewed any attempt to develop a
106. [d. at 543, 253 A.2d at 377.
107. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
108. 263 Md. 94, 282 A.2d 136 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972).
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uniform set of rules for analyzing the hearsay issue, relying instead
on an inconsistent case by case approach. The result was the acceptance of hearsay without much critical analysis of its reliability. It
appears that some of the concerns expressed in earlier cases became
subordinated to the desire of the court to promote an informal
administrative process.
THE MODERN PERIOD (t971-PRESENT)
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court decided Richardson
v. Peraies,Hy} which is generally now considered the leading opinion
on hearsay in administrative law yo Perales involved a claim for
disability benefits after an alleged work injury. At the administrative
hearing, evidence supporting the claim of disability consisted of live
testimony by Perales, his physician, and a fellow employee. Conversely, the written reports of four examining physicians and the live
testimony of a doctor who had not examined Perales, but who had
read the reports of the examining physicians, were presented to refute
the claim.
From the evidence, the agency concluded that Perales was not
disabled. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the hearsay of the doctors refuting the claim
did not constitute substantial evidence because it was contradicted
by the "only live witnesses." III Prompted by a "number of factors
... that assure[d] underlying reliability and probative value"112 of
the evidence, the Supreme Court reversed the fifth circuit decision
and upheld the agency's decision to deny benefits. Among those
factors cited by the Court to justify its opinion were: (1) the doctors
who wrote the report had independently examined Perales; (2) the
reports were based on accepted medical procedures and tests; (3) no
doctor was biased or had any interest in the outcome of the hearing;
(4) there were no inconsistencies among the five reports; (5) Perales
had not exercised his right under Social Security Administration
regulations to subpoena the doctors and cross-examine them; (6) the
social security administrative system is not adversarial, but one in
which the agency acts as an adjudicator not an advocate; and (7)
the "pragmatic factor" that to require live testimony would create
an administrative burden because of the number of cases and the
expense of live witnesses. 1l3
109. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
110. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 7.6; Stern, supra note 19, at 105-06; Faines,
supra note 3, at 360-62.
111. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 53 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), noted in Jeka, supra note 3.
112. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1972).
113. [d. at 402-06.
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The Perales court also distinguished an earlier case, Goldberg v.
Kelly,1I4 in which the Court held that due process required an
"effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witness."IIS The Court noted that, unlike Perales, Kelly involved the
termination, not the initial grant, of a benefit, and that termination
cases present issues of credibility and veracity which are not present
in an initial request for benefits.1I6
Perales has had a tremendous impact on the law of administrative
adjudications. Because it was the first Supreme Court case to address
the issue of hearsay and administrative hearings, and because its
analysis was so elaborate, it replaced Carroll as the preeminent case.
on the hearsay issue. Although the legal residuum rule had never
become as entrenched at the federal level as it had in the states, 117
Perales marked the death knell for Carroll's legal residuum rule in
federal agencies. 1I8 Furthermore, many states looked to Perales to
evaluate their state agency's reliance on hearsay,ll9 At least initially,
114. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
115. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406-07 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69
(1970».
116. Id.
117. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S.
576 (1938); Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969), noted in
Hearsay and the Right oj Conjrontation in Administrative Hearings, 48 N.C.
L. REv. 608 (1969); Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 848 (1966); Davis,
Hearsay, supra note 3, at 695; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 11;
Faines, supra note 3, at 359.
118. Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Calhoun v. Bailar,
626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Cassella v.
Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985), ajj'd, 519
A.2d 67 (Conn. 1987); Martin v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters
Retirement Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 110 (D.C. 1987); Sellnow, supra note 7, at 369;
Stern, supra note 19, at 116 n.79; Faines, supra note 3, at 360 n.l03.
119. See Employer's Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819 (Alaska
1974); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 536 P.2d 197 (Ariz. 1975); Smith V.
Everett, 637 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. 1982); Kirke V. Colorado Dep't of Revenue,
743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985), ajl'd, 519 A.2d 67 (Conn. 1987); In re Kennedy, 503
A.2d 1198 (Del. 1985); District of Columbia V. Jones, 442 A.2d 512 (D.C.
1982); Baehr V. Health & Hosp. Governing Comm'n, 407 N.E.2d 817 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980); McConnell V. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa
1982); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. V. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517
N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1988); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. McLaurin, 370 So. 2d 1359
(Miss. 1979); Conners v. Missouri Div. of Family Serv., 576 S.W.2d 568 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); Hartford Accident & Indem. CO. V. Duvall, 300 A.2d 732
(N.H. 1973); Spilotro V. Nevada Gaming Comm'n, 661 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1983);
Chavez V. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 1375 (N.M. 1982); State Div.
of Human Rights V. Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd., 423 N.Y.S.2d 748
(App. Div. 1979); City of Dayton V. Rutledge, 454 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1983);
Matthew V. Juras, 519 P.2d 402 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Craig V. Pare, 497 A.2d
316 (R.I. 1985); Brooks V. Klevenhagen, 807 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App. Ct. 1991);
Longe V. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76 (Vt. 1977).
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however, Perales did not have a particularly significant impact in
Maryland, for Maryland had never adopted the Carroll doctrine.
The first post-Perales case in Maryland involving hearsay and
administrative hearings was Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of
Assessments for Washington County.12O Fairchild involved a decision
of the Maryland Tax Court, a state agency not bound by the rules
of evidence. 121 In determining the value of a parcel of land, the
agency considered an appraisal report. Upon review of the tax court's
decision, the court of appeals noted that the rules of evidence do
not apply to administrative hearings, and that hearsay, if credible
and of sufficient probative force, may be the sole basis of the
decision. 122 Viewing the record as a whole, the court perfunctorily
concluded that there had been "no violation of the basic rules of
fairness."123 No attempt was made to discuss the reliability of the
report in light of either past Maryland decisions or Perales.
The next case, Rogers v. Radio Shack,l24 dealt with unemployment compensation benefits in a situation where the claimant was
discharged for alleged misconduct. The allegations of misconduct
were presented in an affidavit signed by a "tax accountant" of Radio
Shack. Rogers testified on his own behalf, denying the allegations.
The agency found evidence of gross misconduct and denied benefits.
The claimant then pressed an administrative appeal at which the
record was reopened and new evidence was presented. Despite a
newly introduced letter from a Radio Shack vice president contradicting the tax accountant's allegations and concluding that Radio
Shack would rehire Rogers, the agency nonetheless found evidence
of ordinary misconduct and disqualified Rogers from receiving benefits for a ten-week period. The administrative decision was then
affirmed by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
Several months after the final agency decision, Rogers learned
that the agency had conducted its own investigation and had included
the investigation report in the administrative record filed with the
circuit court. Having never had the opportunity to cross-examine the
investigator or rebut the report's contents, Rogers motioned to strike
the report from the record. The circuit court denied the motion to
strike this report, a decision the court of appeals found to be
erroneous. The court of appeals recognized that although the rules
of evidence do not apply at hearings before administrative agencies,
such agencies must nonetheless observe the "basic rules of fairness
as to parties appearing before them."12s The court found that "fun120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

267 Md. 519, 298 A.2d
Id. at 521, 298 A.2d at
Id. at 523, 298 A.2d at
Id. at 524, 298 A.2d at
271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d
Id. at 129, 314 A.2d at

148 (1973).
149.
150.
150.
113 (1974).
115.
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damental fairness would preclude reliance upon the report" because
there was "no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal." 126
Convinced by its "examination of the record . . . that neither
the Board of Appeals nor the circuit court placed any weight upon
the investigator's report," the court ruled the admission of the
investigator's report was harmless error that did not require reversal
of the denial of benefits. 127 The court did, however, reverse the denial
of benefits because of insufficiency of evidence. 128 The evidence in
the record consisted of two contradictory statements from Radio
Shack, a written statement by Rogers, and live testimony by Rogers.
The tax accountant's affidavit contained no facts describing or delineating the misconduct. 129 Additionally, because the affidavit was
contradicted by the vice president's letter, the tax accountant's affidavit furnished "no evidentiary support"130 for the misconduct findings.
The Rogers opinion, although lengthier than others, is again
conclusory and devoid of analysis. It does, however, raise several
germane issues. First, although not necessary to the decision, the
court was willing to apply a harmless error approach to the use of
hearsay. The harmless error approach here, however, was based on
the court's conclusion that the investigator's report had not been
relied upon by the agency. In earlier Maryland cases, the court's
harmless error conclusions had been based on the cumulative nature
of the hearsay. 131
Second, the court's conclusion that the investigator's report was
not relied upon by the agency is inexplicable, for without the report
the record does not support a finding of misconduct. The more likely
conclusion is that the agency did rely on the report. This once again
illustrates a major problem with the harmless error approach - the
difficulty of evaluating the impact of the hearsay.
Third, despite earlier cases in Maryland which focused on reliability in deciding whether the hearsay could support an administrative decision, the Rogers court did not analyze the reliability of the
two letters submitted by Radio Shack. The court assumed that the
tax accountant's affidavit was unreliable because it was contradicted
by the vice president's letter. There is no rule, however, that hearsay
offered later in time is more reliable than previously offered hearsay.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 130, 314 A.2d
[d. at 131, 314 A.2d
[d. at 131, 314 A.2d
See Horn Ice Cream
George's Creek Coal
78 (1932).

at 116.
at 116.
at 117.
Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); Waddell
Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 53-54, 161 A. 276, 277-
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The Rogers court should have performed a more complete
reliability analysis. The court should have focused on the nature of
the investigation by the tax accountant and the vice president, including from whom the information was gathered and the responsibilities of both Radio Shack officers. Similarly, cross-examination
would have been useful on these issues. The court should have
recognized that the vice president's letter was detrimental to Radio
Shack's position, and thus was a declaration against interest. Such
declarations have traditionally been viewed as reliable. 132 The Maryland court, however, once again showed little interest in fully analyzing the matter.
A few years later, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
decided American Radio-Telephone Service v. Public Service
Commission 133 which involved the granting of mobile radio operating
rights to Radio Communications, Inc. (RCI) based on the agency's
finding that RCI was entitled to be "grandfathered" because of its
earlier service in the area. Three witnesses testified on behalf of RCI
at the administrative hearing relating to past service and past customers. Affidavits of two RCI customers stating that they had used
RCI's services in the past were also introduced. One of these affiants
was on vacation in Florida while the other was never summoned.
Two witnesses testified at the hearing in opposition to RCI.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland first held that the
affidavits should not have been admitted. Echoing the court of
appeals' opinion in Rogers, the court wrote that although administrative agencies are not bound by the technical common law rules of
evidence, agencies nonetheless "must observe the basic rules of
fairness,"134 including the opportunity for reasonable cross-examination. Because the affiants were not available for cross-examination,
the court held that admitting the affidavits constituted error. The
court then concluded, however, that the error was harmless because

132. The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly allow declarations against interest
when the declarant is unavailable and "a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true."
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). McCormick finds these types of statements reliable
because "people generally do not lightly make statements that are damaging
to their interests." 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 316. Maryland has adopted
the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. See Kammer v. Young,
73 Md. App. 565, 581, 535 A.2d 936, 944, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 919 (1988)
(finding statements which are in fact against interest and which a reasonable
declarant would perceive to be against interest under the circumstances to be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule); Agnew v. State, 51 Md. App.
614,627,446 A.2d 425, 433 (1982) (trustworthiness is indicated when statement
of declarant is against pecuniary, proprietary or penal interest).
133. 33 Md. App. 423, 365 A.2d 314 (1976).
134. [d. at 434, 365 A.2d at 320.
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. the opponents "made no request for a postponement or for an
opportunity to bring the affiants in for cross-examination. "135 Moreover, the affidavits were merely cumulative and "infinitesimal" 136
compared to the whole record. Additionally, the court noted that
the hearing examiner, when admitting the affidavits, said that they
"would not be given the same weight as if the people were crossexamined. "137
American Radio-Telephone imbues Maryland case law with several new developments. First, although not citing Perales, the court
considered whether the opponents of the hearsay attempted to have
the out of hearing hearsay declarants testify at the agency hearing.
The court implied that if the hearsay was so prejudicial, the opponents would have sought to attack it through cross-examination.
Second, the court adopted as a general rule that hearsay should not
be given as much weight as nonhearsay. This is inconsistent with
earlier Maryland decisions which rejected such a hostile view toward
hearsayYs Because of the court's reliance on this general hostility
against hearsay, the court did not evaluate the reliability of· the
particular hearsay presented at this agency hearing. This is also
contrary to earlier cases where the court evaluated the reliability of
the specific hearsay at issue. 139
Besides ignoring the issue of reliability, the court also ignored
the issue of the availability of the declarants. When deciding whether
to permit an agency to rely on hearsay, earlier Maryland decisions
had been influenced by whether the hearsay declarant was available.
These cases had indicated a greater willingness to uphold the use of
hearsay if the declarant was truly unavailable, for example, if the
hearsay declarant was dead. l40 Here, the declarants were not unavailable; it was merely inconvenient for them to testify. This factor
was not even mentioned by the court. Finally, the court's holding
that the affidavits were not admissible is narrower than even the
legal residuum rule, never followed in Maryland, and totally contrary
to earlier opinions 141 and to the Maryland Administrative Procedure

135.
136.
137.
138.

[d. at 435, 365 A.2d at 320.
[d. at 436, 365 A.2d at 321.
[d. at 435, 365 A.2d at 320.
See Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276
(1932).
139. See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967).
140. See, e.g., Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).
141. The only opinion that had stated that the hearsay should have been "excluded"
was Standard Gas Equip. Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927).
Every other case recognized that the issue is not one of admissibility, but
rather whether the hearsay was sufficiently reliable to support a finding.
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Act (APA).142 Therefore, except for its emphasis on the cumulative
nature of the hearsay, American Radio-Telephone is a poorly crafted
opinion that ignored relevant issues identified in earlier opinions.
Reliance on this opinion, therefore, should be avoided.
The next case, Eichberg v. Maryland Board of Pharmacy,143
involved an administrative hearing to revoke a pharmacist's license.
At the hearing, testimony offered at an earlier criminal proceeding
was admitted. The court of special appeals' opinion in Eichberg is
confusing. The court first states that "it is well settled in Maryland
that hearsay evidence is admissible" before administrative agencies, 144
and that "the test of admissibility under the Maryland AP A is the
probative value of the evidence, not its credibility. "14S Probative
value, the court stated, "relates to the degree by which the evidence
advances the inquiry, whereas credibility relates to the weight to be
given to the evidence by the trier of fact." 146 The court noted that
in the case at hand, there was no objection on grounds of probative
value or relevancy, but only as to the credibility of the evidence.
This, according to the court, was not grounds for exclusion in this
case because the testimony from the criminal proceeding had been
given under oath and had been subject to cross-examination. Moreover, the witness was unavailable "because she was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Board and the State's effort to produce her was
unsuccessful. "147
The Eichberg opinion is confusing for several reasons. Despite
statements in the opinion that "probativity" is the only criterion to
be used when evaluating an administrative agency's reliance on
hearsay, the court actually used a reliability analysis. The confusion
here results from the court's failure to distinguish between reliability
and credibility. Credibility is in fact a component of reliability. 148
When reliability is affected by the credibility of a witness who has
not testified before the agency, a reviewing court must still make the
reliability determination and consequently consider credibility. 149
Moreover, in making such a reliability determination, the reviewing
court is not bound by the agency's determination of credibility. ISO
142. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §10-208 (1984).

143. 50 Md. App. 189, 436 A.2d 525 (1981).
144. [d. at 193, 436 A.2d at 528.
145. [d. at 193, 436 A.2d at 529.
146. [d. at 194, 436 A.2d at 529.
147. [d.
148. See Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517

N.E.2d 830, 835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting).
149. [d.
150. [d. Factors that a reviewing court may consider when looking for indicia of

reliability include "independence or possible bias of the declarant, the type of
hearsay materials submitted, whether statements are sworn to, whether statements are contradicted by direct testimony, availability of the declarant, and
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Contrary to Eichberg, earlier Maryland cases indicate that credibility
is a relevant concern to a court reviewing the reliability of hearsay. lSI
Dependence on this aspect of Eichberg should therefore be avoided.
Eichberg's basic holding, however, is not troublesome. If the
out-of-hearing declarant is the subject of cross-examination by the
same party in a criminal case, it is appropriate for the agency in an
administrative proceeding to rely on that testimony. Because lack of
opportunity for cross-examination is the major problem with hearsay,
earlier cross-examination should negate this concern. 152
It was not until Tron v. Prince George's County l53 that a
Maryland court relied on the then fifteen year old Perales decision.
Tron involved a disability claim allegedly arising from a work-related
injury. The claimant presented live testimony from a doctor who
testified that the injury was work-related. The county offered no
witnesses to dispute the claimant's contentions, but introduced a
booklet containing the written report of three physicians who had
earlier examined Tron and an opinion from a Dr. Weintraub, who
had never examined Tron. The reports from the examining physicians
described Tron's physical condition but did not address the issue of
whether the condition was work-related. Based upon an examination
of the three reports, however, Dr. Weintraub's written opinion
concluded that the disability was not work-related. Tron challenged
the admission of the booklet on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine any of the doctors.
The Tron court first noted that hearsay generally is admissible
in administrative hearings, and' 'if credible and of sufficient probative

credibility of the declarant." Id. (citing Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981».
151. See, e.g., Fairchild-Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 267 Md. 519,
523-24, 298 A.2d 148, 150 (1973); Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 251 Md.
92, 97-98, 246 A.2d 583, 586-87 (1968).
152. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, former testimony is admissible as a
hearsay exception if the declarant is unavailable and if the party against whom
the testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony in a previous proceeding by direct, cross or redirect examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Furthermore, prior inconsistent testimony made under
oath is considered nonhearsay under ,the Federal Rules. Id. at 801 (d)(1)(A).
Lack of opportunity for cross-examination has been the principal justification
for the exclusion of hearsay evidence. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 245.
Maryland has adopted this reasoning. See Lawson v. State, 25 Md. App. 537,
549, 335 A.2d 135, 141 (1975) (quoting 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972), for the proposition that "an extrajudicial assertion is excluded
unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds of the assertion
and the credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the party against whom
it is offered"); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989
& Supp. 1992) (providing parameters for admissibility of out-of-court statements
of child abuse victims).
153. 69 Md. App. 256, 517 A.2d 113 (1986).
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force, may be the sole basis for the decision." IS4 But the court also
noted that in administrative hearings "a reasonable right of crossexamination must be allowed." ISS The court then held that "the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is a requirement of administrative adjudicatory hearings,"IS6 and that "[b]ecause no live witnesses were produced,"ls7 Tron had been denied his right to a fair
hearing.
The court of special appeals found this case "remarkably
similar"ls8 to Perales, but distinguished it based on the availability
of subpoena power. In Perales, the claimant did not exercise his
right under the Social Security Act to subpoena the doctor. Conversely, in Tron, the claimant had not been provided any subpoena
power by the Prince George's County Disability Review Board. 159
The court interpreted Perales to mean that claimants who forgo their
right to subpoena witnesses cannot later be heard to complain about
their lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. l60 The Tron
court determined that Maryland case law is in accord with Perales,161
so that as long as there is an opportunity to cross-examine, the use
of hearsay does not violate a claimant's rights. 162 Because Tron had
no opportunity to cross-examine, the court reversed the agency,
remanding the case "so that the Board can do a proper job as to
both the evidence and fact finding."163
Tron's significance is two-fold. First, the court's reliance upon
Perales opened the door for use as persuasive authority in Maryland
applications of Perales from other states .164 Secondly, Tron represented the first reversal of a Maryland agency decision based upon
a hearsay opponent's inability to cross-examine the out-of-court
declarant. Whereas previous agency decisions had been reversed on
other grounds, never had the court focused on the issue of whether
the witness could have been subpoenaed. 165 Moreover, earlier Maryland cases had upheld agency decisions based on hearsay even when

154. ld. at 261, 517 A.2d at 116 (quoting Redding v. Board of County Comm'rs,
263 Md. 94, 110, 282 A.2d 136, 145 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972».
155. ld. (quoting Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d
578, 585 (1966».
156. ld. at 263, 517 A.2d at 117.
157. ld.
158. ld.
159. ld. at 264-65, 517 A.2d at 117-18.
160. ld. at 264, 517 A.2d at 117.
16l. ld. at 265, 517 A.2d at 118.
162. ld. at 266, 517 A.2d at 119.
163. ld. at 272, 517 A.2d at 122.
164. See supra note 119.
165. See, e.g., Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113 (1974).
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there had been no opportunity for cross-examination, such as when
the declarant had since died}66 Reading Tron as requiring that there
must always be an opportunity for cross-examination would limit
reliance on hearsay more than had earlier cases. Rather, the holding.
is more appropriately limited to those cases in which there are no
live witnesses nor an opportunity to subpoena live witnesses.
It is interesting that Tron relied on the "ability to subpoena"
aspect of Perales rather than the reliability analysis, which may in
fact better explain Perales. Whereas Maryland courts had long based
decisions on a reliability analysis, Maryland's first embrace of Perales
was, curiously, not on the reliability issue. Had the Tron court
utilized a reliability analysis, its conclusion may well have been
different, for under such an analysis, the court may have recognized
the high reliability of medical reports even absent any live testimony.
Thus .the hearsay evidence presented may well have been sufficiently
reliable to support the agency's decision. Tron's emphasis on the
right of cross-examination, therefore, takes on great significance.
Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Scruggs l67
involved admission of polygraph evidence in an administrative hearing. Despite the well settled law in Maryland that polygraph results
could not be admitted in trial courts,l68 it was argued in Scruggs that
the relaxed evidentiary standards in administrative hearings dictated
that polygraph results should be admitted. 169 The court of special
appeals rejected this argument, finding that the Administrative Procedure Act indicated a clear legislative intent that evidence which is
incompetent in judicial proceedings should be excluded in proceedings
before administrative agencies yo After finding that polygraph evidence had "never been held to be competent" in Maryland,17I the
court held that "unless and until the 'state of the art' of polygraph
testing improves to the extent that it is considered reliable and
trustworthy," such evidence must also be inadmissible at agency
hearings.172 The court further rejected an argument that the admission
was harmless error, 173 as the polygraph evidence was admitted to
bolster the credibility of several persons whose credibility was at the
crux of the case .114

166. See, e.g., Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).

167. 79 Md. App. 312, 556 A.2d 736 (1989).
168. Rawlings v. State, 7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969).
169. Scruggs, 79 Md. App. at 321, 556 A.2d at 740.
170. [d. at 322, 556 A.2d at 741.
171. [d. at 323, 556 A.2d at 741 (quoting Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 303, 418
A.2d 217, 220 (1980».
172. [d. at 313-14, 556 A.2d at 737.
173. See id. at 324, 556 A.2d at 742.
174. [d. at 325, 556 A.2d at 742.
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Strictly speaking, although Scruggs concerns hearsay at an administrative hearing, it is better viewed as a "polygraph" case. The
debate over polygraph evidence in Maryland courtrooms had been
resolved, and the unreliability of polygraph evidence was not open
for discussion in Scruggs. Scruggs is significant as an administrative
law and hearsay case, however, because of its rejection of a harmless
error approach.
In Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day
Nursery,17S a child care center's state license was revoked based on
testimony at an agency adjudication that a number of preschool-aged
children had been physically and sexually abused at the center. None
of the children who had allegedly been abused testified at the
hearing,176 but parents and social workers were permitted to testify
as to what the children had told them.177
Upon initial review of the administrative decision, the circuit
court ruled that the hearing officer should not have considered any
of the children's hearsay statements because there had been no
opportunity to cross-examine them.17s The court of appeals, however,
reversed the circuit court, upholding the agency's revocation order.
Citing Perales, the court stated that "due process does not prevent
an agency from supporting its decision wholly by hearsay if there is
underlying reliability and probative value. "179 Rather than using the
tests for reliability developed in earlier Maryland cases or in Perales,
however, the court utilized a due process balancing test delineated
by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge. lso
In Mathews, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
due process required an adversarial hearing before termination of
social security disability benefits. The Court held that due process
was satisfied by a post-termination hearing where the recipient could
argue for reconsideration, and, if successful, would be entitled to
retroactive payments. lSI Mathews held that "due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."ls2 The Supreme Court's flexible due process analysis
175. 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d 1015 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990).
176. The day care center licensee had not sought to have the children testify at the
administrative hearing, but instead requested an opportunity for a psychologist
chosen by the licensee, to interview the children prior to the open hearing. [d.
at 580, 565 A.2d at 1018.
177. Cf, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992)
(providing parameters for admissibility of out-of-court statements of child
abuse victims).
178. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. at 583, 565 A.2d at 1020.
179. [d. at 595, 565 A.2d at 1026.
180. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
181. [d. at 335-39, 349.
182. [d. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972».

1991]

Hearsay in Administrative Hearings

31

involved a cost-benefit test balancing three factors: (1) the private
interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous determination through
the process accorded and the probable value of added procedural
safeguards; and (3) the public interest and administrative burdens,
including costs that the additional procedures would involve. 183
Relying on Mathews, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in
Bo Peep that there had been no due process violation because: (1)
the revocation of a day care center license did not place any liberty
interest at stake; (2) two hearings had afforded the day care center
procedural protection; and (3) the decision was based only to a degree
(not quantified by the court) on hearsay.184 Moreover, the court felt
that only minimal value would have been gained from "additional
or substitute procedural safeguards." 18S
Although the Bo Peep court agreed that due process requires a
meaningful opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements,
the court was not persuaded that the circumstances presented amounted
to a due process violation. The credibility of the hearsay statements,
according to the court, embraced at least four potential problems:
(1) whether the child's statement to the parents was false; (2) whether
the parents intentionally or unintentionally inaccurately conveyed the
child's testimony at the hearing; (3) whether the adult witness may
have drawn an erroneous conclusion from the child's accurate description; and (4) whether the adult witness may have omitted matters
that the witness deemed insignificant but which would be significant
to another .186 In response to the possibility that the children were
lying, the court relied on findings in psychological studies that
"[y]oung children almost never initiate false allegations without influence from an adult. "187 In addition, the day care center had crossexamined, or had the opportunity to cross-examine, adult witnesses
who testified as to the children's statements. This afforded Bo Peep
the ability to explore whether the other three potential problems in
fact existed. 188 Thus, the court declined to find any due process
violation stemming from a lack of an opportunity to cross-examine
the children. 189
Relying on Perales' emphasis on the ability of the adverse party
to subpoena the hearsay declarant, the state further argued that

183. [d. at 335.
184. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573,
598, 565 A.2d 1015, 1027 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990).
185. [d.
186. [d. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028.
187. [d.
188. [d. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028-29.
189. [d. The court also recogriized the state's interest in protecting the children
from further anxiety. [d. at 601, 565 A.2d at 1029.
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admission of the hearsay was not reversible error because the day
care center could have subpoenaed the allegedly abused children. 190
The court refused, however, to "rest [its] decision on this argument"
because the issue of whether the hearing officer would have been
correct in quashing requests for subpoenas for the children was not
before the courL191
Although Bo Peep is Maryland's most elaborate decision involving hearsay evidence at administrative hearings, its implications are
unclear. Bo Peep relies neither on any Maryland cases on point nor
on Perales. Nor does Bo Peep rely on a reliability analysis, long a
touchstone in Maryland law on the subject, and which had become
well accepted in other states and in the federal courts after Perales.
Because it eschewed a reliability analysis, and because, unlike Maryland cases before and after it, Bo Peep relied almost exclusively on
Mathews, Bo Peep provides little guidance as to the proper role of
hearsay in Maryland administrative determinations. 192
The next administrative hearing case after Bo Peep, Kade v.
Charles H. Hickey School,193 involved the suspension for alleged
misconduct of a supervisor at a state operated detention facility. At
the administrative hearing, the school's superintendent, who was not
present during the alleged incidents, testified as to statements made
to him by others concerning Kade's conduct. Also admitted was a
report by the employee who was the alleged target of the impropriety
and written statements of students who allegedly' witnessed the incident. 194
The Kade court wrote that although hearsay is admissible in an
administrative proceeding and, if credible and probative, can be the
sole basis for a decision by an administrative agency, there are,
190. Id. at 594 n.6, 565 A.2d at 1026 n.6.
191. Id.
192. To the extent there is any reliability analysis in Bo Peep, it is subject to
criticism. The court cited an article in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry to
support the view that the children's statements were not fabricated. Bo Peep,
317 Md. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028 (citing H. Klajnerdiamond, et aI., Assessing
the Credibility oj Young Children's Allegations oj Sexual Abuse: Clinical
Issues, 32 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 610, 611 (1987». The court did not recognize
that there are other studies indicating that the testimony of children in sexual
abuse cases should not always be believed, and that experts are divided on the
reliability of such testimony. At a recent conference, there was deep division
among psychologists over whether child witnesses should be believed in sexual
abuse cases. Some psychologists believe that children may be influenced by
adult suggestions of abuse. Liz Hunt, Psychologists Divided on Children
Testifying, WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at A3; cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing parameters for admissibility of out of court statements of child abuse victims).
193. 80 Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (1991).
194. Id. at 724-26, 566 A.2d at 150-51.
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nonetheless, limits placed on the use of hearsay.195 In this case, the
court determined that it was improper to base the supervisor's
suspension solely on hearsay evidence, because "[e]ven though the
statements were relevant, there was no indication that this hearsay
evidence was reliable, credible or competent."I96 The court relied on
the following factors to reach this conclusion: (1) the employee's
statement was not sworn nor did it reflect the circumstances under
which it was obtained; (2) the statements from the students were not
sworn, dated, or verified; and (3) the statements did not indicate the
students' ages, nor any other information about them to show
whether they were competent witnesses. l97
Moreover, the Kade court was concerned that there was no
explanation in the record as to why the hearsay declarants were
unavailable to testify in person, nor as to why the school had failed
to exercise its right to compel their attendance at the hearing. 198
Although determinations of credibility were crucial, the hearing officer had "no basis for evaluating the credibility" of the hearsay
declarants. l99 Finally, the court noted that the hearsay had been
directly contradicted by live testimony. 200 The court also distinguished
Eichberg, Mealey and Quasny, because in those cases, there was
someone who could have been "examined as to when, where and
how the hearsay statements were made. "201 Furthermore, in those
cases, unlike in the case at hand, there was some logical or practical
reason why the declarant was not available to testify at the administrative hearing.202 The Kade court thus concluded that because the
agency based its decision on unreliable hearsay, the decision was not
supported by substantial evidence.203
Kade marked a return to a reliability analysis. It is generally
consistent with earlier opinions and presents perhaps the best analysis
of the hearsay issue by a Maryland court. Kade does, however,
present one interesting departure from earlier case law in that it
relied on the fact that the proponent of the hearsay did not subpoena
the out-of-hearing declarant, whereas both Perales and Tron concerned the ability of the opponent to subpoena the declarant. Placing
195. [d. at 725, 566 A.2d at 150.
196. [d. at 726, 566 A.2d at 151.
197. [d.
198. [d.
199. [d. at 727, 566 A.2d at 151.

200.
201.
202.
203.

[d.
[d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 151.
[d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 151-52.
[d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 152. Because of its reversal on substantial evidence
grounds, the court found that it was not necessary to address the issue of
whether Kade's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
had been violated. [d. at 728-29, 566 A.2d at 152.
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the burden on the proponent to subpoena the declarant may tip the
balance toward limiting the role of hearsay at agency hearings,
something which would be quite significant should it be adopted as
the Maryland rule. Furthermore, Kade's emphasis on the availability
of the witness to testify at the administrative hearing appears to be
stronger than expressed in earlier cases. Although the Kade court
claimed that unreliability of the hearsay was the basis for reversing
the decision, it seemed at least equally influenced by the lack of
necessity for the hearsay.
The most recent Maryland case discussing hearsay at administrative hearings is Changing Point, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources
Planning Commission,204 which involved a license application for an
alcohol and drug abuse treatment facility. In this case, an existing
substance abuse treatment facility challenged the agency's decision
to approve a new center. One of the arguments made by the existing
facility was that the agency decision was improperly based on a
written trust agreement which constituted hearsay. 20S The court found
no problem with the trust agreement because it had been available
to the opponent to examine before the hearing. 206 Moreover, the
person who knew the most about the trust agreement testified as a
witness and was thus available for cross-examination.207
The hearsay challenge made in Changing Point was rather weak.
Two points are worth noting, however. First, the court maintained
that an opponent of the hearsay should not be able to object if the
opponent did not subpoena those responsible for the hearsay. This
is the more traditional attitude, but one contrary to Kade's focus on
the failure of the hearsay proponent to subpoena out-of-hearing
declarants. Second, the court was influenced by the prior availability
of the hearsay, a factor that had not been treated as significant in
prior Maryland decisions.
Summary
In reviewing the cases decided in Maryland from 1971 to the
present, most notable is the Maryland courts' failure to adopt any
consistent analytical framework addressing the hearsay issue. Perhaps
most significant is Maryland's lack of. express reliance on Perales,
even though Perales has become the basis of most decisions in other
states. Although some recent Maryland opinions discuss the hearsay
issue in greater detail than most earlier cases, the lack of a consistent
approach has led to inconsistent opinions. In reviewing all of the
204.
205.
206.
207.

87 Md. App. 150, 589 A.2d 502 (1991).
[d. at 169-71, 589 A.2d at 511-12.
[d. at 171, 589 A.2d at 512.
[d.
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Maryland cases on the subject, litigants can find support for a variety
of arguments, many of which are entirely contradictory. Moreover,
the inconsistency of the reported decisions can create confusion not
only among the litigants, but also within the administrative agencies
which have not been given sufficiently clear guidance as to the
parameters that should govern reliance on hearsay.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
For over sixty-five years, Maryland courts have dealt with the
issue of hearsay in administrative hearings on an ad hoc basis,
resulting in inconsistent and generally unsatisfactory opinions. For
the most part, Maryland courts have not identified considerations
that would justify different treatment of hearsay from one case to
another. The hearsay issue should be resolved as part of an analytical
framework that: (1) provides predictable guidance to administrative
agencies; (2) takes into account the fact that not all administrative
adjudications are the same; and (3) recognizes that hearsay which is
sufficiently reliable in one adjudication may not be sufficiently reliable in another. 208 The next section focuses on developing such a
framework.

Nature of the Claim or Issue
In developing a framework to determine when hearsay is sufficient by itself to support an agency decision, the nature of the claim
or issue pending before the agency should be considered. 209 It has
been suggested, for example, that proceedings such as revocations of
professional licenses warrant greater scrutiny of, and less willingness
to rely on, hearsay than proceedings such as initial claims for
disability, workers' compensation, or unemployment benefits.210
208. See Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P .2d 16,22 (Colo. 1987) (differing
hearsay standards are appropriate based on the particular type of proceeding);
see also Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 698; Davis, Problems oj Evidence,
supra note 3, at 423; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 16.
209. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981); Davis, Problems oj Evidence,
supra note 3, at 387, 393; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21; John M. Hutchins,
Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado, 17 COLO. LAW. 651,
652 (1988); Odes L. Stroupe, Jr., Note, Hearsay Need Not Be Supported by.
Competent Guidance in Exclusionary Proceedings Pursuant to the Casino
Control Act, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 214, 216 (1988).
210. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 387 (positing that taking
away a license equivalent to livelihood should not be done without opportunity
for cross-examination); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21 (positing that an agency
may rely on evidence to deny the grant of a license that would be inadequate
to revoke the same license).
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Such a disparate treatment of hearsay is warranted for several
reasons. First, the number of license revocation cases is small relative
to the number of cases in which persons are seeking benefits. Therefore, the cumulative burden on an agency to develop a factual record
not solely dependent on hearsay is not as great in license revocation
cases. Although hearsay may be a "necessary evil" in such an
immense setup as the social security disability system,2I1 those agencies
that do not have such a large adjudicatory caseload need not rely
on the hearsay "shortcut."
Second, someone faced with a license revocation is far more
likely to be represented by counsel at the agency hearing than
someone merely seeking a benefit. 212 An attorney's involvement will
tend to formalize the process regardless of whether or not hearsay
is admitted. Thus one of the major justifications for acceptance of
hearsay - the informality of administrative proceedings - becomes
much less relevant. Moreover, a party's right of cross-examination
becomes much more meaningful when counsel is present. Reliance
on hearsay defeats this right and inappropriately limits the role of
the lawyer.
A third justification for focusing on the nature of the pending
claim or issue is simply that certain matters are more important than
others. For matters of greater import, reliance on hearsay ought to
be discouraged. 213 One problem inherent in such an approach is
distinguishing the "more important" from the "less important" case.
For example, while a routine unemployment compensation case might
ordinarily be viewed as less important than a professional license
revocation case, to the unemployed person seeking benefits there is

211. See Perales, 402 u.s. at 406; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 699; Harry
Kalven, Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 329
(1971).
212. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 365, 396-97; Stephen D.
Natcher, Note, Hearsay Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 369, 371 (1964) (comparing representation by counsel in civil trials to
representation at administrative hearings).
213. See, e.g., Lim v. Taxicab Comm'n, 564 A.2d 720, 724-25 (D.C. 1989); Chavez
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 1375, 1380 (N.M. 1982) (Easley, C.J.,
dissenting); Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 610 P .2d 747, 748 (N .M.
1980); Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 462 P.2d 139, 143 (N.M. 1969); Davis,
Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 7; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21; Jeka, supra
note 3, at 161; see also Perales, 402 U.S. 389; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Ceja, 427 A.2d 631; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 699; cf
Bernard Schwartz, A Decade oj Administrative Law: 1942 - 1951, 51 MICH.
L. REv. 775, 817 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945),
for the position that the seriousness of the penalty of deportation mandates
that "meticulous care" be taken to achieve "essential standards of fairness"
in deportation hearings).
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no more important case. Nevertheless, when evaluating the reliability of hearsay in order to determine whether it is sufficient to
support an agency decision, consideration of the nature of the claim
or issue involved is a reasonable criterion.
1991)

Nature oj the Evidence
In addition to focusing on the nature of the issue involved, the
agency should give consideration to the nature of the hearsay evidence
sought to be introduced. First, agencies should consider whether the
substantive nature of the evidence is more easily understood if
presented in written form or if presented orally.21S For example, it
has been suggested that complicated medical testimony is more easily
digested by an agency when presented in written form.216 In such
cases, a liberal attitude toward hearsay may be justified in order to
save the agency's time and to increase the agency's understanding of
the evidence. On the other hand, as discussed later, consideration
should also be given to whether the author of the report should be
available for cross-examination even if the presentation of the case
is adequate via the written report. 217 This would be true, for example,
if the report were so complicated that without the author's in-person
explanation, the agency would not be able to comprehend it.
Other considerations involving the nature of the evidence include
whether the hearsay evidence is conclusory218 or ambiguous,219 for
such evidence is unlikely to be sufficient to support an agency finding.
Additionally, courts have been especially reluctant to find double
hearsay sufficiently reliable to support an administrative decision.220
Other factors useful in analyzing the reliability of hearsay at administrative hearings include: (1) whether the hearsay was sworn under
oath;221 (2) whether the hearsay statements were made close in time

214. See Ceja, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("to the claimant the
administrative hearing is not 'routine"').
215. See Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d
671, 678-79 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., concurring).
216. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 82122 (Alaska 1974).
217. See infra notes 240-247 discussing usefulness of cross-examination.
218. See Martin v. Police & Firefighters Retirement Relief Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 111
(D.C. 1987).
219. See Collins v. D'Elia, 480 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 (App. Div. 1984).
220. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
221. See Kade v. Hickey, 80 Md. App. 721, 726, 566 A.2d 148, 151 (1989); Embers
of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830,
835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting); Unemployment Compensation Bd. v.
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981).
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to the incident at issue;222 and (3) whether the hearsay has been
corroborated. 223 For example, uncorroborated hearsay is rarely viewed
to be reliable. 224 Uncorroborated hearsay that has been contradicted
is even more unlikely to be held to be reliable. 225 All these factors
which relate to the nature of the evidence are appropriate to consider
in analyzing the reliability of hearsay and in determining whether the
hearsay is sufficient to support an administrative decision.

Identity of the Out of Hearing Declarant
In addition to the nature of the issue and the nature of the
evidence, the identity of the hearsay declarant should be a relevant
consideration in evaluating the reliability of the hearsay. As a general
rule, hearsay evidence from unidentified persons should never be

222. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 639
(deeming medical reports reliable because they were written immediately after
examination); Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652; Jeka, supra note 3, at 160.
223. See Hentges v. Bartsch, 533 P.2d 66, 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Jadallah v.
District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 678 (D.C.
1984) (Ferren, J., concurring); McConnell v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 327
N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1982) (finding hearsay evidence that "merely supplements" other evidence admissible); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; Davis, Residuum
Rule, supra note 3, at 6; Stern, supra note 19, at 115.
Hearsay has been allowed to be corroborated by other hearsay. See Peters
v. United States, 408 F.2d 719, 722-24 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see id. at 738
(Skelten, J., dissenting) ("Adding hearsay to hearsay is like adding zero to
zero which still equals zero."). Also relevant is whether the corroboration of
the hearsay is by the opponent of the hearsay. Corroboration by an opponent
will lend strong support to the reliability of the hearsay. See Altholtz v.
Connecticut Dental Comm'n, 493 A.2d 917, 921 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985);
Embers oj Salisbury, 517 N.E.2d at 833.
224. See Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938) ("mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence"); Silver
v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 129 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416 (Ct.
App. 1976) (uncorroborated hearsay that is contradicted is not sufficient by
itself to support a finding); Wallace v. District of Columbia Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972) (substantial evidence includes
more than uncorroborated hearsay); Stroupe, supra note 209, at 610 n.14
(collecting cases citing the substantial evidence test in Consolidated Edison).
225. See Jacabowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555, 562-63 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Kowal
v. United States, 412 F.2d 867, 871-73 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Embers oj Salisbury,
517 N.E.2d at 835 (Lynch, J., dissenting); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; cf. Cassella
v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (corroborated
hearsay has a high degree of probative value); In re Thompson, 583 A.2d
1006, 1007 (D.C. 1990) (uncorroborated hearsay is reliable if declarant also
testified at hearing and could have been cross-examined about out-of-hearing
statements).
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acceptable as the basis of an administrative decision. Hearsay from
an out-of-hearing declarant who might be biased should not enjoy a
presumption of reliability and should be viewed with strong suspicion
and carefully evaluated.227 For example, in unemployment compensation cases involving allegations of employee misconduct, the hearsay
statements of those customers who have alleged the misconduct
should be carefully scrutinized because the customers cannot be
viewed as neutral. 228 Hearsay evidence of misconduct offered from
the employer should be scrutinized even more intensely because of
the interested nature of their testimony.229
Conversely, courts have found certain classes of hearsay declarants to be especially reliable. For example, courts have held physician's reports to be highly reliable because of the medical profession's
high standards of expertise. 230 Reports from both examining physicians,231 and physicians who assess the records of examining
226

226. Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652 (citing Griffin v. Evans Electrical Constr.
Co., 529 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App. 1975»; see also, Kade v. Hickey Sch., 80
Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (1989).
227. See Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of EmploYment, 476 A.2d 671, 679
(D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., concurring) (stating that an agency should consider
bias and interest of the witness, consistency of statement with other evidence,
and opportunity for opposing counsel to investigate the statement); Cassella v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Peters v.
United States, 408 F.2d 719, 724 (Cl. Ct. 1969) (affidavit signed in return for
government's promise of immunity); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic
Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 832 (Mass. 1988) (minor's hearsay
testimony that she had been sold alcohol was attacked as unreliable because
of bias based on her attempt to prove intoxication as a defense to a serious
criminal charge); Longe v. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76 (Vt.
1977); Bonney v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 519 P.2d 383, 388 (Or. Ct. App.
1974) (reports written by inmate's accusers are less detached).
228. See Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (Cooper,
J., dissenting).
229. Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 644 (Pa. 1981);
Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546 A.2d 1365, 1368 (Vt.
1988); see also Drogaris v. Martine's Inc., 118 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960) (hearsay from fellow employees should also be viewed suspiciously
because of their reluctance to testify against employer's interest).
230. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Carlson v. Kozlowski, 374 A.2d
207, 208 (Conn. 1977) (citing Perales); Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of
Human Resources, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (N.C. 1982); Martin v. District of
Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 110 (D.C. 1987)
(citing Perales); see also, Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652 (citing Perales and
Ceja); Kalven, supra note 211, at 330-31 (construing Perales and Kelly v.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970».
231. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402; Martin, 532 A.2d at III (applying Perales). Cf.
Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 (1976)
(testimony of a nontreating physician is inadmissible).
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physicians 232 are deemed reliable. Courts have also generally found
reliable written reports of "licensed medical professionals" so long
as the hearsay involves matters within their expertise and is unbiased.233 Similarly deemed reliable are police reports made in connection with an officer's law enforcement duties,234 as well as official
reports made by other public employees.23S
Courts have found dealing with the hearsay statements of children especially troublesome, particularly where sexual abuse is alleged. Psychologists are divided on whether children testify accurately
about such events. 236 Because of this conflict, in cases where a minor
is the hearsay declarant, various factors relating to reliability should
be closely evaluated. For example, the testimony of social workers
concerning a child's hearsay statements is generally more reliable
than testimony from the child's parents, who cannot be viewed as
disinterested. 237 Other relevant factors in determining the reliability
of a child's testimony include whether the child's story was ambiguous
or subject to misinterpretation,238 and whether the child's statements
were made as part of a narrative or in response to leading questions. 239

A vailability of Nonhearsay and Usefulness of Cross-Examination
Other relevant areas of inquiry are the availability of nonhearsay
and whether cross-examination of the hearsay declarant would be
useful. 240 Nonhearsay should generally be preferred, and, if available,
232. Perales, 402 U.S. at 404; Ceja, 427 A.2d at 639. But see Georgia Pac. Corp.
v. McLaurin, 370 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Miss. 1979) (doctors are merely human
and may not be considered wholly free from the frailties that beset the rest of
us).
233. Schaffer v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 759 P.2d 837 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (nurses); Altholtz v. Connecticut Dental Comm'n, 493 A.2d 917, 921
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (dentists); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641 (listing factors affecting
reliability); see also Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652.
234. See Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987).
235. See In re Kevin G., 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (1975) (pam. Ct. 1975) (relying
on presumption of "official regularity" and on fact that report was "routine"
and "impersonal" in concluding that a laboratory report by a police chemist
was reliable); Webster ex rei Lisa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
499 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (medical examiner's report);
Craig v. Pare, 497 A.2d 316, 320 (R.1. 1985) (accident reports prepared by
Division of Motor Vehicles); see also, Steven P. Grossman & Stephen P.
Shapiro, The Admission'of Government Fact Findings Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C): Limiting the Dangers of Unreliable Hearsay, 38 KAN. L.
REv. 767 (1990).
236. See Hunt, supra note 192, at A3.
237. A.Y. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 583 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (quoting L.W.B. v. Sosnowski, 343 A.2d 1241, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988».
238. Id. at 520; B.G. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 583 A.2d 672, 674 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
239. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1990).
240. See Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
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there should be less willingness to permit an agency to rely on
hearsay.241 When forced to rely on hearsay, it is more acceptable
that the hearsay be from a declarant who is truly not available, such
as a d~cedent, rather than from a declarant who is absent without
excuse or merely because Of inconvenience.242 Nonetheless, the concept of unavailability must embrace the practical expense of producing a live witness. 243 For example, the expense of producing a doctor
to testify might be so burdensome as to justify an agency's reliance
on hearsay testimony from the doctor. 244
The value of cross-examination of the particular hearsay declarant has also been cited as a relevant factor in evaluating an agency's
reliance on hearsay. 24S If it can be concluded that cross-examination
would not have benefitted the hearsay opponent, then there would
seem to be little problem with the agency's reliance on hearsay. Such
was the situation in a New York case where the court relied on the
written report of a police laboratory chemist out of a belief that it
would have been impossible for the chemist to recall the particular
tests he performed when writing the report. 246 Although this approach
may sometimes be useful, it must be exercised with caution. Predicting the utility of cross-examination in any given case may be
difficult because cross-examination often brings out unexpected matters.247 In order to avoid unjust reliance on the presumption that
cross-examination would not be beneficial, the hearsay proponent

241.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

u.s. 906 (1981); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n of New Britain, 494 A.2d
909, 913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (relying on 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.7-8 (1980»; Unemployment Compensation Bd. v.
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (pa. 1981) (citing DAVIS, supra, § 14.10 (1958 & Supp.
1970»; Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546 A.2d 1365
(Vt. 1988); Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5.
See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 2; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5;
Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 376; Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; Longe v. Department of Employment
Sec., 380 A.2d 76, 79 (Vt. 1977).
See Longe, 380 A.2d at 79. Compare Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md.
116, 148 A. 246 (1930) (declarant deceased) with Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271
Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113 (1974) (declarant available but not called).
See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 822
(Alaska 1974) (cost of medical experts); Kalven, supra note 211, at 329
(administrative efficiency).
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971).
See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 11.
In re Kevin G., 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
See Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52,
225 A.2d 294 (1966). The court wrote that it would be a mockery of justice
to hold that a person cannot complain of the denial of the right to crossexamine unless it can be shown what the result of the cross-examination would
have been because that result is "often as unexpected as it is revealing." Id.
at 66, 225 A.2d at 303.
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ought to bear the burden of proving that cross-examination would
not benefit the hearsay opponent.
Another consideration related to availability and usefulness of
hearsay is whether the proponent exercised a right to subpoena the
out-of-hearing declarant. 248 Hearsay opponents who have a right to
subpoena and who believe that cross-examination would be helpful
ought to exercise their subpoena rights; failure to do so should
effectively waive any claim of prejudice in not being able to crossexamine. Conversely, it would be improper for an agency that lacks
procedures that allow an opponent to subpoena a hearsay declarant
to rest a decision on hearsay. 249
A few qualifications to this view seem appropriate. First, even
when subpoena procedures are available, some have expressed concern about the propriety of requiring the hearsay opponents to
subpoena as a witness someone whose hearsay is damaging to them.250
One Pennsylvania judge wrote that it is "contrary to our jurisprudence to require an individual to call adverse witnesses against
himself. "251 It has also been noted that to require the opponent to
subpoena the unfavorable witness unfairly shifts the burden of proof
to the opponent. 252 This is especially troublesome in matters where
the state has the burden yet attempts to prove its case solely through
hearsay.
Another concern expressed with the subpoena rule involves the
expense of producing the hearsay declarant. The Supreme Court of
Alaska has held that there is no waiver if the hearsay opponent is
required to bear the cost of producing the witness at the hearing. 253
The court suggested that the agency be required to pay the cost or
248. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 404-05; Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja,
427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981); Kirke v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 743 P.2d 16
(Colo. 1987); Langlois v. Department of Employment Training, 546 A.2d 1365,
1369-70 (Vt. 1988); Webster ex rei Lisa v. Workman's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 499 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Dowd v. District of
Columbia Police & Firefighters' Retirement Bd., 485 A.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C.
1984).
249. See Souch v. Califano, 599 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1979); Sisler v. Califano, 484
F. Supp. 326 (N.D.W.V. 1979); Smith v. Everett, 637 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ark.
1982); Tron v. Prince George's County, 69 Md. App. 256, 517 A.2d 113
(1986); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., 'concurring); see also Stern, supra
note 19, at 118.
250. See Jeka, supra note 3, at 155, 159, 164; Stroupe, supra note 209, at 612-16.
251. Ceja, 427 A.2d at 647 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Dragan v. Connecticut
Medical Examining Bd., 591 A.2d 150, 154 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991), a/I'd 613
A.2d 739 (Conn. 1992).
252. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 536 P.2d 197, 201-02 (Ariz. 1975);
Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d
830, 835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 647 (Roberts,
J., concurring); Collins, supra note 66, at 600.
253. Commercial Union Co. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261, 1266-67 (Alaska 1976).
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that the cost be taxed to the losing party. 254 It has also been suggested
that once a party has raised a "credible reason to question the
reliability of the hearsay," the agency itself should issue the subpoena
so that the declarant can personally testify.m

Nature oj the Agency and Its Adjudicatory Hearings
Differences between agencies may lead to disparate treatment of
hearsay by these agencies. For example, differences in the required
qualifications of both those who preside at the hearings and of those
who may make the decision might be taken into account. 256 It has
been suggested that nonlawyer hearing officers will be less able to
ignore questionable hearsay than hearing officers who are lawyers. 257
Lawyers are accustomed to dealing with the rules of evidence and
admissibility at jury trials, and thus are able to ignore evidence even
after it has been presented, while nonlawyers may not be able to
disregard such evidence. 258 This reasoning leads to the conclusion that
there should be more reluctance to permit a decision to be based on
hearsay if a nonlawyer, as opposed to a lawyer, presided. Conversely,
nonlawyer hearing officers will most likely be employed in informal
proceedings where the parties are unlikely to be represented by
counsel, in which case a stricter rule concerning hearsay and nonlawyer presiding officers would be counterproductive.
The distinction between lawyer and nonlawyer presiding officers
may be even more significant where the issue is whether unreliable
hearsay was used to buttress other evidence in the record or to
support the credibility of a witness, the so called "harmless error"
approach.259 If it is accepted that nonlawyers are less able to disregard
unreliable evidence, then reliance on a harmless error argument
should be closely scrutinized if a nonlawyer official is involved. 260
Another consideration focuses on the workload of the hearing officer.
It can be argued that hearing officers who hear a wide variety of
254.
255.
256.
257.

/d.

Ceja, 427 A.2d at 642.
Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 396-97.
Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67. In Maryland, the Chief Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) must be a member of the Maryland Bar. MD. CODE ANN., STATE
Gov'T § 9-1603(c)(2) (Supp. 1992). The Chief ALJ is charged with establishing
ALJ qualifications. Id. § 9-1604(a)(2). Qualification standards currently in
force require that any ALJ appointed after February 1, 1990, be a member in
good standing of a bar in any jurisdiction. Qualification Standards Administrative Law Judge, 1990 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ANN. REp., app.
5.
258. Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67.
259. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
260. Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67.
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cases involving diverse fact patterns might have greater difficulty
evaluating the reliability of hearsay than hearing officers who routinely hear cases with common factual and legal issues. 261 Hearing
officers presiding over cases from a number of dissimilar agencies
should be especially cautious in their hearSay analysis.
Another issue to consider is whether the agency's hearings are
adversarial. Agencies whose hearings are adversarial should not be
permitted to rest their decisions on hearsay to the same degree as
agencies whose hearings are less adversarial and more informal.262 A
related inquiry is whether the parties usually are represented by
counse1. 263 If lawyers typically represent parties at an agency's hearing, then reliance on hearsay may be less justified than if lawyers
are not typically present, for the mere participation by a lawyer will
tend to formalize the process, regardless of the issue at hand.
Moreover, the right of cross-examination is more meaningful when
exercised by a lawyer. It can also be argued that because lawyers
understand and appreciate the value of cross-examination, the use of
hearsay may be a tactical decision by a lawyer to deny the opponent
an opportunity to discredit the evidence. In such a situation, the
agency should be especially careful in permitting hearsay to be the
sole basis of its decision.
The amount of precision required in making the agency decision
is yet another factor to consider. Some agency decisions require
precise factual findings, while others require only general conclusions,
perhaps of a more legislative quality. The scrutiny given the reliability
of the hearsay should rise commensurately with the precision required
for resolution of the factual issues. 264 A further inquiry is whether
the adjudication relates to particular facts involving a particular party

261. See Stern, supra note 19, at 103-04 (quoting 1 S. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 36 (3d
ed. 1940». At the Maryland OAH, the Chief Administrative Law Judge has
the power to assign administrative law judges. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T
§ 9-1604(a)(4) (Supp. 1992). A system of regional dockets has been implemented
in order to increase efficiency and convenience. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS, 1990 ANN. REp. 1. In conjunction with this, a quality assurance
program was developed. After an ALJ is cross-trained in new areas, his or her
draft decisions are reviewed by experienced Subject Matter Specialists (SMS).
Once competence is demonstrated in that subject area, the ALJ is certified by
the Chief Administrative Law Judge as qualified to hear that type of case
without SMS supervision. Id. at 2-3.
262. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971); Davis, Problems oj
Evidence, supra note 3, at 379; Jeka, supra note 3, at 161.
263. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 365, 396-97.
264. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 9-11; Davis, Problems oj Evidence,
supra note 3, at 388-90.
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or whether it relates to a broader policy issue. 26s More leeway should
be permitted with hearsay in hearings which are aimed at developing
policy rather than adjudicating particular private rights.
The standard of proof at the agency hearing might also be
relevant in evaluating the reliability of hearsay and its ability to
support a finding. Less flexibility should be permitted in relying on
hearsay if the standard necessitates a finding supported by clear and
convincing evidence as opposed to a finding that must be supported
only by a preponderance of the evidence. 266 This would typically also
relate to the importance of the issue being litigated. 267
The standard of judicial review might also be relevant. If the
standard of review on appeal is de novo, it seems appropriate to
accept hearsay at the administrative leveJ.268 The most liberal approach to hearsay would be to create as full a record as possible.
This could facilitate settlements and totally bypass the need for
judicial review. Moreover, because a trial de novo is available, there
can be little claim of prejudice from the hearsay.

Procedural Safeguards
As well as the aforementioned substantive factors which should
be used to evaluate the proper role of hearsay, agencies should also
consider implementing procedures to alleviate some of the problems
that arise from reliance on hearsay. For example, it has been suggested that if a party intends to rely on hearsay, the hearsay should
be provided to the opponent prior to the hearing,269 thus enabling
the opponent to contact the declarant to discuss the hearsay, or
265. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 3, at 424.
266. Hutchins, supra note 209, at 363.
267. See discussion supra notes 209-214. The higher standard of proof should be
viewed as indicative of an increased sense of importance of that issue.
268. See Sellnow, supra note 7, at 363.
269. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); ladallah v. District of
Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 679 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren,
1., concurring) (citing 10hnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 191 (D.C. Cir.
1980»; Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (Cooper,
1., dissenting); Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 591 A.2d 150,
154 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages
Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 832-33 (Mass. 1988); Kalven, supra note
211, at 331.
Maryland provides for testimony to be received in written form in the
discretion of the administrative law judge; if allowed, such testimony must be
filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings and served on opposing parties
no later than 10 days before the hearing. OAH Rules of Procedure, COMAR
28.02.01. 18(E). As this provision is permissive, not mandatory, the practical
significance of this section is as yet unclear.
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alternatively, to file with the agency a notice of intent to crossexamine. 270 It would then be the duty of the agency to issue a
subpoena for the declarant or rule that a subpoena was not necessary.271 The burden of showing that a subpoena should not be issued
should be on the proponent of the hearsay.
It has also been suggested that if a system of prior notice is not
established, agencies should liberally grant continuances if, after the
hearsay has been presented, the opponent requests an opportunity
for cross-examination. 272 Another suggested alternative is that if the
agency's decision does rely on hearsay, the losing party would have
a right to request the reopening of the record for the purpose of
subpoenaing and cross-examining the adverse hearsay witnesses.273 At
this point, the burden should be on the opponent of the hearsay to
justify the need for cross-examination.

Summary
Because Maryland case law has proceeded on an ad hoc basis,
parties and agency personnel are without a consistent, predictable
framework upon which to rely when dealing with the proper role of
hearsay in administrative adjudications. This section of the article
has defined those factors which could form the basis of a framework
of analysis on the hearsay issue. These factors are: (1) the issue
involved; (2) the nature of the evidence presented; (3) the identity of
the out of hearing declarant; (4) the availability of the out of hearing
declarant and the usefulness of cross-examination; and (5) the nature
of the agency and its adjudicatory hearings. Procedural rules have
also been offered which could help avoid. potential unfairness that
may result from an agency's reliance on hearsay. The next section
will discuss how these proposals can be implemented in Maryland.
270. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 823
(Alaska 1974).
271. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981).
Various rules of the Maryland OAH relate to subpoenas. The notice of hearing
must contain a statement "of the right to request subpoenas for witnesses and
evidence." COMAR 28.02.01.05(B)(3). The ALJ has power to "£i]ssue subpoenas for witnesses and the production of evidence: COMAR 28.02.01.08(B)(2).
Other rules guide the request of, issuance of, service of, objection to, and
enforcement of subpoenas. COMAR 28.02.01.11.
272. See Silver v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 129 Cal. Rptr. 411,
415 (Ct. App. 1976); Dowd v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters'
Retirement Bd., 485 A.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C. 1984); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749
(App. Div. 1979); Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546
A.2d 1365, 1369 (Vt. 1988); see also OAH Rules oj Procedure, CO MAR
28.02.01.08(B)(7) (granting ALJ power to grant continuances); COMAR
28.02.01.08(B)(2) (granting ALJ power to issue subpoenas).
273. See Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); see also
Reynolds v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 94 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div.
1950).
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IMPLEMENTATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
There is a practical reason why a consistent and predictable
approach to the proper role of hearsay at administrative hearings is
desirable. When preparing for an administrative hearing, an attorney
or an unrepresented litigant must decide whether to ask a supporting
witness to make a personal appearance, possibly requiring the witness
to take time off from work or to incur child care or travel expenses,
or whether the witness' sworn testimony in the form of an affidavit
would be sufficient. Because Maryland cases lack sufficient guidance
on the proper role of hearsay at administrative hearings, the only
safe posture at present would be to request the witness to testify in
person. Yet this is antithetical to the administrative process' function
of providing an informal process and its willingness to rely on
hearsay. Refinement of the treatment of hearsay is therefore important not only to guide the litigants, but also to maintain the integrity
of the administrative process.
Such refinement is best provided not at the judicial level, but at
the administrative level. As discussed in the previous section, differences inherent in administrative adjUdications may lead to different
conclusions about the role of hearsay in those adjudications. What
may be reliable to support one agency adjudication may not be
sufficiently reliable to support another. That this point has generally
not been recognized in court decisions is not surprising, given that
courts have no special understanding or insight into the adjudications
each agency conducts. Such understanding and insight does, however,
exist at the administrative level. Therefore, it is suggested that administrative guidelines be adopted in order to achieve some predictability on the hearsay issue. 274
In Maryland, this process would need to be done at various
levels because of the advent of the Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH). Prior to 1990, most administrative cases in Maryland were
adjudicated by hearing examiners employed by the individual agencies. In 1990, however, the OAH was created as a central hearings
agency,275 and was given the power to adjudicate cases from many, 276
274. See Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976). The

court "strongly recommended" to the Workmen's Compensation Board that
they adopt procedures to fill the "procedural void relating to medical reports
and the right to cross-examination." Id. at 1267.
275. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1602 (Supp. 1992).
276. OAH hears cases on behalf of about twenty state agencies administering over
two hundred different programs. The vast majority of hearings before OAH
are from the Motor Vehicle Administration. Other agencies whose cases are
heard by OAH include Department of Mental Health and Hygiene, Department
of Human Resources, Department of Licensing and Regulation, Department
of Personnel, Department of the Environment, Department of Natural Resources, Human Relations Commission, Tax Court, Department of Education,
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but not all,277 administrative agencies. Those agencies that do not
come under OAH jurisdiction should independently promulgate their
own guidelines for hearsay. These guidelines should be based on the
factors discussed earlier in this Article. 278 For those agencies that do
come under OAH jurisdiction, the process will be a bit more complicated. Because OAH hears cases from different agencies, it will
need to work with each agency to develop hearsay guidelines for that
particular agency's adjudications. 279 In going through this process,
Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems, Board of Public Works,
Higher Education Commission, Office of the Attorney General, Secretary of
State, and Department of Agriculture. See OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
INFORMATIONAL BROCHURE; OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, 1990 ANN.
REp., app. 1.
277. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1601 (Supp. 1992) excludes the Governor,
. the Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Inmate Grievance, Public Service,
Workmen's Compensation, Parole, Health Services Cost Review, and Health
Resources Planning Commissions from OAH jurisdiction. Furthermore, local
and county agencies do not come under OAH jurisdiction.
278. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to draft hearsay regulations for
every agency, application of some of the factors discussed earlier in the article
to some of the Maryland agencies not under OAH jurisdiction is possible. For
example, the fact that judicial review of Workmen's Compensation Commission
cases is de novo, see General Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 555
A.2d 542 (1989), should be most significant in the Commission's adoption of
hearsay regulations. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. Decisions of
the Public Service Commission and the Health Services Cost Review Commission would most likely involve decisions involving factual precision. See supra
note 264 and accompanying text. Decisions of the Health Resources Planning
Commission, on the other hand, tend to be based on future facts and the
broader policy issue of whether a certificate of need for a new hospital should
be issued. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. Public Service Commission decisions are sometimes based on technical reports without the author
being available for reports. This type of hearsay should be treated differently
than hearsay statements made to a utility investigator by a neighbor of a
customer who is being investigated for fraud. See supra notes 223-235 and
accompanying text. It should also be noted that Maryland agencies already
have the statutory authority to adopt the type of hearsay regulations proposed
in this article. In fact, MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-204(a) (1984),
requires each agency to adopt regulations to govern procedures for contested
cases.
279. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to draft hearsay regulations for
every agency, application of some of the factors discussed earlier in the Article
to some of the Maryland agencies under OAH jurisdiction is possible. For
example, development of hearsay regulations for the Motor Vehicle Administration should take into consideration the vast number of MV A cases heard
each year (over 37,000 in 1990). See supra note 210. This should be compared
to hearings before the Department of the Environment where attorneys usually
are present. Additionally, MV A hearsay regulations should recognize that
hearsay should not be treated the same in all MV A adjudications. For example,
hearings involving complaints against dealers might treat hearsay differently
than hearings involving the assessment of points against a driver. See supra
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OAH may find that it is possible to develop guidelines that relate to
a group of agencies or group of adjudications. On the other hand,
some agency adjudications under OAH may need their own hearsay
guidelines and concomitant procedural rules. 280
The adoption of hearsay guidelines by the agencies should have
an impact on judicial review of administrative decisions based on
hearsay. In the future, after the guidelines are in place, the major
judicial inquiry will be whether the agency reasonably applied its
guidelines and properly followed its procedures. This should simplify
judicial review by avoiding the fact specific analysis of earlier cases.
It would also add predictability to the judicial review process and
hopefully avoid the inconsistent ad hoc approach that plagued earlier
decisions.
CONCLUSION
State administrative agencies should be permitted to rely on
hearsay in reaching a decision. Refusing to consider hearsay would
be counterproductive to the goals of the administrative process. When

notes 209-214 and accompanying text. Moreover, the reliability of medical
reports would be most relevant to MYA Medical Advisory Board decisions.
See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
Another illustration involves the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Although most agency decisions need be supported only by the preponderance of the evidence, some decisions from DHMH must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. For example, under MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
Occ. § 14-405(b) (1991), factual findings by the Board of Physician Quality
Assurance relating to disciplinary actions against physicians must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. Hearsay guidelines for such hearings should
take this into consideration. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
Accord MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 7-503(e) (1990) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence for involuntary admission of a person to a state residential
center for mental retardation); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-1407(1)(2)
(1990 & Supp. 1992) (requiring clear and convincing evidence in hearings
assessing monetary penalties against nursing homes).
In many adjudications before OAH, credibility is not a major concern. In
MYA hearings concerning suspension of a license, MYA documents are the
major source of evidence. On the other hand, in a Human Relations Commission matter involving employment or sex discrimination, issues of credibility
are crucial. Hearing guidelines for OAH should take this into account.
Not all OAH hearings are adversarial. Hearings for the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene which are aimed at deciding what is "best" for
the patient, such as forced medication issues, might take this nonadversarial
nature into account when developing hearsay rules.
280. OAH has the statutory authority to implement the suggestions in this article.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 9-1604(a)(8) (Supp. 1992) requires the Chief
Administrative Law Judge to develop model rules of procedure and other
guidelines for administrative hearings.
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an agency decision is based solely on hearsay, however, the hearsay
must be reliable in order to ensure fundamental fairness. Agencies
should adopt guidelines that govern the treatment of hearsay so that
unreliable hearsay will not be considered. Such guidelines should take
into account factors unique to the particular agency and the particular
adjudication. In addition, agencies should promulgate procedural
rules to help safeguard a party's right to test the reliability of the
evidence offered at the hearing. Adoption of the suggestions set forth
in this Article will provide guidance to parties and agency personnel,
and result in simpler, more consistent judicial review.

